University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2017

Misclassification and Antidiscrimination: An
Empirical Analysis
Charlotte S. Alexander

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Alexander, Charlotte S., "Misclassification and Antidiscrimination: An Empirical Analysis" (2017). Minnesota Law Review. 151.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/151

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article

Misclassification and Antidiscrimination:
An Empirical Analysis
Charlotte S. Alexander

†

INTRODUCTION
“Misclassification” refers to employers’ practice of classifying workers as independent contractors whom the law would
1
categorize as employees. These workers are controlled by and
economically dependent on a single employer, and lack the flexibility, entrepreneurial opportunity, and autonomy of true in2
dependent contractors. By virtue of their contractor status,
† Assistant Professor of Legal Studies, Robinson College of Business,
Georgia State University; secondary appointment, Georgia State University
College of Law. Thanks to Alejandro del Valle, Kate Griffith, Nathaniel Grow,
Michael Harper, Joni Hersch, Barry Hirsch, Stephen Shore, Julia Tomassetti,
and Noah Zatz for their helpful feedback and to Misha Cohen and Iliana
Dobrev for their excellent work as case coders. Thanks also to the participants
in the Colloquium on Scholarship in Employment and Labor Law at Indiana
University Bloomington, the University of Georgia Terry College of Business
Legal Studies faculty seminar, and to the anonymous reviewers of earlier
drafts of this work from the Conference on Empirical Legal Studies and the
Academy of Legal Studies in Business. Copyright © 2017 by Charlotte S. Alexander.
1. Workers may also be misclassified as interns, trainees, volunteers,
partners, shareholders, and/or member-owners of limited liability companies.
See Clackamas Gastroenterology Assocs., P.C. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440 (2003)
(discussing shareholders as employees); Paul Johnson Drywall Inc. Agrees To
Pay $600,000 in Back Wages, Damages and Penalties Following U.S. Labor
Dep’t Investigation, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (May 19, 2014), https://www.dol.gov/
opa/media/press/whd/WHD20140827 (discussing LLC members as employees);
infra note 61 (discussing cases concerning interns, trainees, and volunteers).
2. Part III.B.1 discusses the legal tests that courts use to determine a
worker’s true employment status, including considering employer control and
economic dependence. In the legal literature, the archetypal example of a true
independent contractor is the self-employed plumber. See, e.g., Richard R.
Carlson, Why the Law Still Can’t Tell an Employee When It Sees One and How
It Ought To Stop Trying, 22 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 295, 340 (2001) (“A
plumber, for example, might be a contractor if installing good plumbing is a
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misclassified workers have few workplace rights, as nearly all
federal labor and employment statutes apply exclusively to em3
ployees and not to independent contractors. This means that,
in most circumstances, employers are free to reject workers for
jobs, fire them, and otherwise discriminate on the basis of sex,
religion, or disability, for example, and to be absolutely explicit
about their reasons for doing so, as long as those workers are
classified as independent contractors.
Courts, however, are meant to act as a check on employers’
classification power. Despite their status, misclassified workers
may file suit alleging violations of their workplace rights and
4
seek reclassification for purposes of the litigation. High profile
discrete end the parties seek to achieve, and where the owner or general contractor wishes to have no involvement in the details of the plumbing.”). A vivid
example of misclassified workers, on the other hand, may be found in Heath v.
Perdue Farms, Inc., where workers who were previously classified as employees arrived at their jobs only to find that they had been summarily reclassified
as independent contractors, with little to no change in their job duties, pay
structure, or any other term or condition of work. 87 F. Supp. 2d 452, 460–61
(2000) (“Prior to January 1, 1991, Perdue readily acknowledged that its crew
leaders and chicken catchers were employees. In 1991, Perdue made an attempt to create a new system under which the crew leaders could be deemed
independent contractors. In reality, however, nothing of substance changed in
the manner in which Perdue related to its live haul crews except the manner
in which they were paid.”).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 requires all people to receive the same treatment as
white citizens in contracting, and so has been used by some contracted workers to pursue race and national origin discrimination claims. 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981(a) (2012); see also Danielle Tarantolo, Note, From Employment to Contract: Section 1981 and Antidiscrimination Law for the Independent Contractor Workforce, 116 YALE L.J. 170, 184–85 (2006) (explaining § 1981’s coverage
of contracted workers). Otherwise, independent contractors are barred from
bringing claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e (2012), the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12111 (2012),
the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2012), and the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 630 (2012). Contractors also fall outside the
coverage of other federal statutes that provide rights on the job: the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 152 (2012) (protecting workers’ rights to organize, bargain collectively, and engage in concerted activity), the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 652 (2012) (protecting workers’ rights to
a safe workplace), the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (2012) (guaranteeing the minimum wage and overtime pay), and the Family and Medical
Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. § 2611 (2012) (providing workers with leave time for selfcare and care of others). See generally Lewis L. Maltby & David C. Yamada,
Beyond “Economic Realities”: The Case for Amending Federal Employment
Discrimination Laws To Include Independent Contractors, 38 B.C. L. REV. 239,
239–40 (1997) (describing the exclusion of independent contractors from coverage of federal antidiscrimination laws, with the single exception of 42 U.S.C.
§ 1981).
4. Notably, the misclassification question is a threshold inquiry in the
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class actions against FedEx, Uber, and Amazon, for example,
have asserted overtime and other pay claims in connection with
5
those companies’ use of independent contractors. This litigation has received significant public and academic attention, focused primarily on misclassification’s implications for wage and
6
hour law in the new “gig,” “sharing,” or “on-demand” economy.
Less attention has been paid to the connections between
7
misclassification and antidiscrimination. Reams have been
written about the weakening and narrowing of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)—the central federal antidiscrimination law—as courts have erected procedural and sub8
stantive barriers to plaintiff success. Yet an antidiscrimination
underlying substantive labor or employment law case, not a cause of action in
and of itself. The act of misclassification does not constitute a violation of federal employment law, at least as currently interpreted by the U.S. Department
of Labor. However, some scholars disagree. See, e.g., Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, Labor’s Wage War, 35 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 373, 378 (2008) (“[T]he current [Wage and Hour Division] administrator has stated on several occasions
that it is not a violation of any of the laws enforced by the WHD to misclassify
workers as independent contractors. This is false, as the [Department of Labor] can and should investigate any complaints by workers claiming unpaid
wages, whether or not they are called independent contractors.”). However,
the act of misclassification in and of itself does violate some state laws. See
Christopher Buscaglia, Crafting a Legislative Solution to the Economic Harm
of Employee Misclassification, 9 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 111, 120–28 (2009) (discussing state laws that penalize the act of misclassification).
5. See Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., Inc., 765 F.3d 981 (9th
Cir. 2014); Second Amended Class Action Complaint and Jury Demand,
O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-3826-EMC, 2014 WL 7912596 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 16, 2013); see also Greg Bensinger, Amazon Faces Lawsuit over
Whether Delivery Workers Are Employees, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 27, 2015), http://
www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-faces-lawsuit-over-whether-delivery-workers
-are-employees-1445989623.
6. See, e.g., Elizabeth Tippett, Using Contract Terms To Detect Underlying Litigation Risk: An Initial Proof of Concept, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 549
(2016) (discussing implications of misclassification litigation for the “sharing
economy”); Julia Tomassetti, From Hierarchies to Markets: FedEx Drivers and
the Work Contract as Institutional Marker, 19 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1083
(2015) (analyzing FedEx litigation in depth and investigating its implications
for labor and wage-and-hour law); Kevin Roose, Does Silicon Valley Have a
Contract-Worker Problem?, N.Y. MAG (Sept. 18, 2014), http://nymag.com/daily/
intelligencer/2014/09/silicon-valleys-contract-worker-problem.html (investigating misclassification of workers by “on-demand” companies such as Homejoy
and Uber).
7. The only scholarly article that addresses the connections between misclassification and discrimination directly is decades old. See Nancy E. Dowd,
The Test of Employee Status: Economic Realities and Title VII, 26 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 75 (1984) (arguing that courts should cease using the common
law test for employee status in Title VII cases).
8. See, e.g., Sandra F. Sperino & Suja A. Thomas, Fakers and Floodgates,
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law’s effectiveness depends not only on the strength of the doctrine, but also on its ability to reach the workers whom the law
is intended to protect. In this view, the misclassification question is key to the antidiscrimination project, as employers may
use their classification power to write workers out of the law,
and workers who cannot win a misclassification challenge in
court cannot gain access to Title VII rights. However, little is
known about the extent to which misclassification affects
groups of workers who are also at high risk for employment
discrimination. Nor do we have data on the outcomes of misclassification challenges in Title VII cases. In other words, we
do not know the extent to which misclassification is pulling
workers out of Title VII’s coverage, and the extent to which the
courts are pulling them back in.
Accordingly, this Article investigates misclassification and
antidiscrimination. The Article makes two novel empirical contributions. First, the Article combines previous research in labor economics with data from the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics to investigate misclassification’s occupational and
demographic distribution. This analysis finds that women
and/or people of color are overrepresented in seven of the eight
occupations at highest risk for misclassification, suggesting
that misclassification may be removing Title VII protection
from workers who most need antidiscrimination rights.
Second, the Article presents the results of an original empirical study of all federal court decisions available on Westlaw
from 2005 to 2014 in which workers made misclassification arguments in Title VII cases. The Article examines which workers made misclassification challenges, which won, and why.
Here, the Article concludes that courts may not be adequately
10 STAN. C.R. & C.L. 223, 247–49 (2014) (summarizing barriers to Title VII
plaintiffs). There is also an extensive body of empirical literature on the poor
chances of Title VII plaintiffs in federal courts. See Kevin M. Clermont &
Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in Federal Court:
From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 132 (2009); Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare
in Federal Court, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429 (2004); John J. Donohue III
& Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983 (1991); John J. Donohue III & Peter Siegelman,
The Evolution of Employment Discrimination Law in the 1990s: A Preliminary
Empirical Investigation, in HANDBOOK OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION RESEARCH: RIGHTS AND REALITIES 261 (Laura Beth Nielsen & Robert L. Nelson
eds., 2005); Laura Beth Nielsen et al., Individual Justice or Collective Legal
Mobilization? Employment Discrimination Litigation in the Post Civil Rights
United States, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 175 (2010).
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performing their backstopping function in misclassification
cases, both because the workers who are most at risk for misclassification and discrimination do not appear to be filing suit,
and because courts’ processing of misclassification challenges
can be deeply flawed.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I describes misclassification’s history and scope and presents data on the characteristics of misclassified workers and their coverage by Title VII.
Part II describes the methodology used in coding courts’ Title
VII misclassification decisions and provides descriptive statistics summarizing the coding results. Part III sketches out three
theories—legal formalism, contractual formalism, and critical
realism—that might predict the outcome of plaintiffs’ misclassification challenges, and then presents regression results that
identify the variables associated with plaintiffs’ misclassification wins. Part IV discusses the implications of these results.
Part V concludes.
I. MISCLASSIFICATION AND TITLE VII
A. MISCLASSIFICATION’S HISTORY AND SCOPE
David Weil, Administrator of the U.S. Department of Labor’s Wage and Hour Division, describes misclassification as
the outgrowth—and perversion—of companies’ attempts to
shed employees whose work falls outside the core competency
9
of the business. As Weil explains it, since the late 1970s, pressure from “investors, lenders, and capital markets” has pushed
companies “to focus their attention on those activities that added greatest value (such as product design, product innovation,
cost or quality efficiencies, or other unique strengths) while
farming out work to other organizations not central to their
10
core mission.” Advances in technology and communication
then enable lead companies to direct, monitor, and oversee the
11
work they have shed through the contracting process. Over
time, companies’ labor outsourcing has only increased, and “independent contracting [has] popped up in places that previously would have been regarded as traditional employment situa-

9. DAVID WEIL, THE FISSURED WORKPLACE: WHY WORK BECAME
FOR SO MANY AND WHAT CAN BE DONE TO IMPROVE IT 10–11 (2014).

SO BAD

10. Id. at 11.
11. Id. at 44 (“[T]echnological changes created new ways of designing and
monitoring the work of other parties, inside or outside the corporation.”).
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12

tions.” Many of these newly minted independent contractors
are misclassified, bearing little resemblance to the “business
entities in their own right” that would properly be exempt from
13
antidiscrimination and other employment laws. Nevertheless,
misclassification has proven a profitable and relatively low-risk
strategy for companies in an environment of vague legal stand14
ards and lax enforcement.
Today, much of the research on misclassification uses surveys and audits to estimate lost federal and state tax revenues
when misclassified workers fail to pay the correct taxes on their
income. If those workers had been properly classified as employees, the thinking goes, then their employers would have
withheld taxes throughout the year, preventing underpayment
15
by the workers themselves at tax time. At least eleven
16
17
18
19
states, three federal agencies, unions, journalists, and ad12. Id. at 24.
13. Id. at 21.
14. As the U.S. Supreme Court has put it, the task of distinguishing between employees and independent contractors “depends upon criteria often
subtle and uncertain of application.” Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 82 (1932);
see also RICHARD J. REIBSTEIN ET AL., PEPPER HAMILTON LLP, THE 2015
WHITE PAPER ON INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION: HOW COMPANIES CAN MINIMIZE THE RISKS (2015), http://www.pepperlaw.com/
publications/the-2015-white-paper-on-independent-contractor
-misclassification-how-companies-can-minimize-the-risks-2015-04-27 (“The
use and misuse of independent contractors has increased dramatically over
the last two decades. This has been due, in large part, to the combination of
two factors: (1) economic and other business advantages derived from the use
of 1099ers and (2) lax regulatory enforcement—a classic risk/reward calculus.”).
15. See Mandy Locke & Franco Ordoñez, Why Is Worker Misclassification
a Problem?, STAR-TELEGRAM (Sept. 4, 2014), http://www.star-telegram.com/
news/special-reports/article3871866.html (“The company acts as a tax collector
of sorts. Before employees pick up their paychecks each week, the company
siphons off the pieces of it that Uncle Sam demands in taxes. The practice
works. The IRS says it collects 99 percent of what it’s owed from employees on
the payrolls of companies. Workers treated as contractors, on the other hand,
often elude tax collection.”).
16. MICHAEL P. KELSAY ET AL., DEP’T OF ECON. UNIV. OF MISSOURIKANSAS CITY, THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION IN THE
STATE OF ILLINOIS 3 (2006), http://www.faircontracting.org/PDFs/prevailing_
wages/Illinois_Misclassification_Study.pdf (summarizing results of studies
conducted in eleven states).
17. LALITH DE SILVA ET AL., PLANMATICS, INC., INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS: PREVALENCE AND IMPLICATIONS FOR UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE PROGRAMS (2000), https://wdr.doleta.gov/owsdrr/00-5/00-5.pdf (prepared for the
U.S. Department of Labor Employment and Training Administration); U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-717, EMPLOYEE MISCLASSIFICATION:
IMPROVED COORDINATION, OUTREACH, AND TARGETING COULD BETTER EN-
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20

vocacy groups have conducted such studies, finding in New
Jersey, for example, that “38 percent of employers were . . .
misclassifying their workers and much, much higher rates of
misclassification [were] found in certain industries,” particular21
ly in construction. Another report found misclassification
rates of between thirteen and twenty-three percent in industries across eleven states, producing tax losses in the tens and
22
hundreds of millions per state. Likewise, according to U.S.
Government Accountability Office estimates, the last time the
Internal Revenue Service conducted a comprehensive misclassification estimate, “the federal government lost out on $2.72 billion in Social Security, unemployment, and income taxes be23
cause of employee misclassification.”
DETECTION AND PREVENTION (2009), http://www.gao.gov/assets/300/
293679.pdf; U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, WHILE ACTIONS HAVE BEEN TAKEN
TO ADDRESS WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION, AN AGENCY-WIDE EMPLOYMENT
TAX PROGRAM AND BETTER DATA ARE NEEDED (2009), https://www.treasury
.gov/tigta/auditreports/2009reports/200930035fr.pdf.
18. See, e.g., DEP’T FOR PROF’L EMPS., MISCLASSIFICATION OF EMPLOYEES
AS INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS: FACT SHEET 2016, http://dpeaflcio.org/wp
-content/uploads/Misclassification-of-employees-2016.pdf.
19. See, e.g., Jones Fitzgerald, Wage Theft: How Two States Are Fighting
Against Companies That Categorize Employees as Independent Contractors,
PAC. STANDARD (Sept. 11, 2014), https://psmag.com/wage-theft-how-two-states
-are-fighting-against-companies-that-categorize-employees-as-independent
-abd474d362e7#.k87t06ilc; Misclassified: Contract To Cheat, MCCLATCHY DC,
http://media.mcclatchydc.com/static/features/Contract-to-cheat.
20. See, e.g., SARAH LEBERSTEIN, NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR MISCLASSIFICATION IMPOSES HUGE COSTS ON WORKERS AND
FEDERAL AND STATE TREASURIES (2012), http://nelp.org/content/uploads/2015/
03/IndependentContractorCosts1.pdf.
21. The Misclassification of Workers as Independent Contractors: What
Policies and Practices Best Protect Workers?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Health, Emp’t, Labor & Pensions and the Subcomm. on Workforce Prots. of the
H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 110th Cong. 49–50 (2007) (statement of David
Socolow, Comm’r, New Jersey Department of Labor and Workforce Development).
22. KELSAY ET AL., supra note 16; see also Employee Misclassification,
NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and
-employment/employee-misclassification-resources.aspx (last visited Nov. 27,
2016) (summarizing state studies’ findings, including $125 million lost tax
revenues in Illinois in the years 2001 to 2005 and $50 million in annual losses
in Rhode Island).
23. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-06-656, EMPLOYMENT ARRANGEMENTS: IMPROVED OUTREACH COULD HELP ENSURE PROPER WORKER
CLASSIFICATION 2 (2006), http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06656.pdf. These tax
losses explain, in part, employers’ motivation to misclassify: “It’s estimated
that a business can save 30 percent of their labor costs by using independent
contractors rather than employees. . . . That provides a real incentive for busiSURE

914

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:907

Yet apart from these tax loss studies, as labor scholar Annette Bernhardt puts it, “we have very little data” on the characteristics of misclassified workers themselves, and no data at
24
all on the connections between misclassification and Title VII.
The difficulty is that misclassification is a form of “disguised
work,” an employment arrangement that is hard for research25
ers to identify because the worker’s true status is obscured.
The Sections that follow begin to fill in those blanks, drawing on what little data there is to paint a portrait of the misclassified worker and his or her coverage by Title VII. As Figure 1 illustrates, the task is to identify those workers who are
misclassified, those who are likely to bring Title VII claims, and
then estimate the overlap between the two. In this way, we can
make our best guess about the workers who are both at high
risk for misclassification and for discrimination, thus needing,
but lacking, Title VII coverage.

nesses to classify their workers as independent contractors, even if the workers are truly employees. While not always a deliberate attempt to flout the
law, such savings allow a business to gain a competitive edge over other businesses.” NAT’L CONF. OF ST. LEGISLATURES, supra note 22.
24. Annette Bernhardt, Labor Standards and the Reorganization of Work:
Gaps in Data and Research 7 (Inst. for Research on Labor and Emp’t, Working
Paper No. 100-14, 2014), http://www.irle.berkeley.edu/workingpapers/100-14
.pdf. In response to the paucity of data on misclassification, the U.S. Department of Labor has launched a huge data-gathering initiative described at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/workers/misclassification. States have also launched
their own misclassification initiatives. See, e.g., LINDA H. DONAHUE ET AL.,
THE COST OF WORKER MISCLASSIFICATION IN NEW YORK STATE 5 (Cornell
Univ. ILR Sch. ed. 2007), http://www.digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1009&context=reports (describing New York’s initiative).
25. Int’l Labour Org. [ILC], International Labour Conference, The Scope
of the Employment Relationship, Report V, at 24–25 (2003), http://www.ilo.org/
public/english/standards/relm/ilc/ilc91/pdf/rep-v.pdf (“A disguised employment
relationship is one which is lent an appearance that is different from the underlying reality, with the intention of nullifying or attenuating the protection
afforded by the law. It is thus an attempt to conceal or distort the employment
relationship, either by cloaking it in another legal guise or by giving it another
form in which the worker enjoys less protection.”).
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Figure 1: Overlap Between Misclassified Workers and
Potential Title VII Plaintiffs

Misclassified
workers

Potential
Title VII
plaintiffs

B. IDENTIFYING MISCLASSIFIED WORKERS
In a line of research that is little known in legal scholarship, labor economists have attempted to identify misclassified
workers by exploiting inconsistencies between two sets of federal records: individual workers’ self-reported wage and salary
earnings from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Current Population
Survey (CPS), and employers’ reports of those same workers’
earnings from the Social Security Administration’s Detailed
26
Earnings Records (DER). The CPS is a monthly survey of
workers that collects a variety of labor force statistics, includ27
ing earnings. The DER assembles employers’ records of workers’ earnings and their tax classification as employees or inde28
pendent contractors. For a properly classified employee, the
CPS and DER earnings figures should match: the worker reports his or her wage and salary income—earned as an employee—on the CPS, and the employer reports that same income—
26. MARC ROEMER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, TP-2002-22, USING ADMINISTRATIVE EARNINGS RECORDS TO ASSESS WAGE DATA QUALITY IN THE MARCH
CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY AND THE SURVEY OF INCOME AND PROGRAM
PARTICIPATION 1 (2002), http://www2.census.gov/ces/tp/tp-2002-22.pdf (describing data sets).
27. About the Current Population Survey, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Nov. 30,
2015), http://www.census.gov/programs-surveys/cps/about.html.
28. Christopher R. Bollinger et al., Trouble in the Tails? Earnings Nonresponse and Response Bias Across the Distribution 2 (Aug. 2015) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with author) (“Access to the DER is advantageous as it
affords the opportunity to fill in missing earnings for nonrespondents [to other
surveys], and to compare survey responses to administrative tax records for
respondents.”).
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with the “employee” tax designation—in the DER. Mismatches,
with the worker reporting dollars earned as an employee (or so
the worker thought), and the employer reporting only independent contractor earnings, signal a possible misclassifica29
tion. Table 1 illustrates this mismatch.
Table 1: CPS and DER Income Reporting and Implications for Employment Status
“Employee”
Income Reported:
CPS

“Employee”
Income Reported:
DER

Implication For Employment Status

Yes

Yes

Probably not misclassified

Yes

No

Possibly misclassified as an
independent contractor

No

Yes

Possibly misclassified as an
30
employee

No

No

Probably not misclassified

It is important to note that misclassification rates gleaned
from CPS-DER mismatches are not the result of a third party’s
29. Id. at 9 (“[W]orkers may report . . . that they received wage and salary
earnings, while the company from which they received pay instead reports it
to IRS as self-employment earnings. The employer for tax purposes treats
them as non-employees . . . and reports earnings on a 1099-MISC in Box 7
(‘Nonemployee compensation’) rather than a W-2.”). A CPS-DER mismatch
may also be evidence that workers were paid “off-the-books,” i.e., that they
were considered employees by their employers but were paid in such a way as
to avoid tax reporting requirements. Id. at 8. The CPS-DER comparison method does not distinguish between mismatches caused by misclassification and
those caused by off-the-books payment arrangements. Id. at 14; see also
Katharine G. Abraham et al., Exploring Differences in Employment Between
Household and Establishment Data, 31 J. LABOR ECON. S129, S133 (2013)
(discussing differences between off-the-books and misclassified workers).
However, some scholars view off-the-books and misclassified workers as one
and the same. See, e.g., Payroll Fraud: Targeting Bad Actors Hurting Workers
and Businesses: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions and the Subcomm. on Emp’t & Workplace Safety, 113th Cong. 3 (2013)
[hereinafter Payroll Fraud Hearing] (statement of Catherine K. Ruckelshaus,
National Employment Law Project) (“These [off-the-books] workers are de facto misclassified independent contractors, because the employers do not withhold and report taxes or comply with other basic workplace rules.”).
30. This version of “misclassification” differs from the version that is the
focus of this Article, as the worker views him or herself as an independent contractor and the employer views him or her as an employee. This circumstance
might arise where an employer attempts to claim intellectual property created
by a worker, for example. Thanks to Julia Tomassetti for this insight.
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independent assessment of any given work arrangement, such
as the analysis a court would perform at the threshold of a Title
31
VII case. What CPS-DER comparisons measure is a mismatch
between the perceptions of the parties to the employment relationship: the worker’s belief that her income derives from work
performed as an employee versus the employer’s belief that the
same income derives from an independent contractor relationship. Indeed, CPS-DER mismatch findings might be overinclusive, in that a worker who believes that she is an independent contractor—because she receives a 1099 non-employee
earnings form at tax time, for example—might still report her
earnings as “employee” income on the CPS, due to a misunderstanding of the CPS questions. Such a result would generate a
“false positive” CPR-DER mismatch.
Mismatch findings from CPS-DER comparisons might also
be under-inclusive, because they draw data only from workers
32
with a Social Security number, thereby omitting many undocumented workers who might be subject to misclassification.
Given that undocumented workers tend to hold jobs at the low
end of the labor market, the CPS-DER mismatch findings may
therefore skew toward higher-paid, higher-skilled occupations
33
and omit undocumented workers entirely.
Nevertheless, despite the limitations of the data, CPS-DER
mismatch findings begin to sketch a picture of the occupational
distribution of misclassification. By mining CPS and DER
mismatches, it is possible to identify both the occupations that
appear to be most at risk for misclassification—i.e., the ones in
which the largest percentages of workers are misclassified—
and those that contribute the most misclassified workers to the
workforce—i.e., those in which the largest absolute numbers of
workers are misclassified. A 2002 U.S. Census Bureau technical paper by Marc Roemer provides the most recent available
34
analysis of both measures of misclassification.
31. For a discussion of courts’ misclassification analyses, see infra Part
III.B.1.
32. ROEMER, supra note 26, at 8.
33. See generally Madeline Zavodny, Do Immigrants Work in Worse Jobs
than U.S. Natives? Evidence from California, 54 INDUS. REL. 276 (2015) (using
California as a case study to show immigrant employment statistics).
34. ROEMER, supra note 26, at 8. In addition to the self-reporting issue
identified above, the present application of the Roemer research is limited
somewhat by its age, as it draws on mismatches gleaned from data from 1991,
1994, and 1997. Because many scholars believe that misclassification has
spread to new occupations in recent years, see, e.g., WEIL, supra note 9, at 24,
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Roemer uses CPS-DER mismatches to generate a list, reproduced with some modifications in Table 5 in the Appendix,
of the forty occupations in which mismatches occurred with a
35
likelihood ratio of at least one percent. Figures 2 and 3 below
show, respectively, the fifteen occupations in which ten percent
or more workers were misclassified, and the top fifteen occupa36
tions by absolute number of misclassified workers.
Figure 2: Occupations with Ten Percent or More Workers Misclassified

the Roemer list does not perfectly describe today’s misclassified workforce.
Nevertheless, it represents our best guess as to the occupation profiles of misclassified workers.
35. The original version of this table appears in ROEMER, supra note 26,
app. A, tbl.10. The version in Table 5 in the appendix has been modified as follows. Instead of reporting likelihood ratios, which are difficult to reverseengineer from Roemer’s table without access to the underlying data, Table 5
reports percentages calculated from the figures reported in Roemer’s table.
Table 5 also converts the occupation names listed in Roemer to their closest
equivalent among the standardized occupations used in U.S. Bureau of Labor
Statistics data.
36. The ten percent cutoff is employed in order to produce a manageable
subset of high-misclassification occupations, as is the display of the top fifteen
occupations by absolute number of workers.
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Figure 3: Top Fifteen Occupations by Number of Mis37
classified Workers

As Figure 2 shows, those workers most at risk for misclassification were real estate brokers and sales agents, roughly
forty-four percent of whom appear to be misclassified. Figure 3
also lists real estate brokers and sales agents as the top occupation in terms of the absolute number of misclassified workers. Seven other occupations also appeared on both lists: clergy;
lawyers; judges, magistrates, and other judicial workers; hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists; maids and housekeeping cleaners; teacher assistants; and door-to-door sales
workers, news and street vendors, and related workers. Taken
together, these eight high misclassification occupations account
for approximately 1.6 million workers, or just over one percent
of employed persons sixteen years and older in the 2014 work38
force. They are the occupations that Roemer’s work suggests
are most at risk for misclassification and the greatest contribu-

37. ROEMER, supra note 26.
38. The total number of employed workers in 2014 was 146,305,000; the
total number of misclassified workers in the eight occupations, per Roemer,
was 1,569,000, or 1.07 percent of the employed population. Labor Force Statistics from the Current Population Survey, BUREAU LAB. STATS., http://www.bls
.gov/web/empsit/cps_charts.pdf (last visited Nov. 27, 2016) [hereinafter Labor
Force Statistics]; ROEMER, supra note 26, at app. A, tbl.10.
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tors to the overall number of misclassified workers in the labor
force.
A full explanation of why different occupations have particular misclassification rates is outside the scope of this Article, though Roemer does suggest reasons for some occupations’
presence on his list:
There may be accounting idiosyncrasies at work here. Commissions
from real estate sales may follow peculiar accounting conventions, allowing workers to opt out of the Social Security system [thereby generating a CPS-DER mismatch]. Tax law can consider the clergy selfemployed, although in the . . . CPS context they clearly work for wag39
es because they have an employer and don’t own a business.

For purposes of this Article, the reason that a worker is misclassified is irrelevant. Whether misclassification is the result
of innocent accounting idiosyncrasies or employer malfeasance,
the impact on the worker’s antidiscrimination rights is the
same: Title VII does not apply, unless the worker can prove
40
otherwise in court.
Thus, the Roemer list begins to fill in the left-hand circle in
the Venn diagram shown above in Figure 1. The next tasks,
then, are to identify those workers who are most likely to become Title VII plaintiffs, and then to determine the extent to
which the two categories overlap.
C. IDENTIFYING POTENTIAL TITLE VII PLAINTIFFS
Potential Title VII plaintiffs must satisfy two threshold requirements: (1) they must be employed, as an employee, by a
covered employer, defined as one that employs at least fifteen
41
employees; and (2) they must have experienced discrimination
on the basis of their membership in one of the five protected
42
classes: race, sex, religion, national origin, and color. With respect to the first requirement, according to some estimates, approximately sixteen percent of employees work for firms small
enough to escape the statute’s coverage, leaving an estimated
43
eighty-four percent of U.S. employees covered.

39. ROEMER, supra note 26, at 14–15.
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1964) (prohibiting employers’ discriminatory employment practices).
41. Id. § 2000e(b).
42. Id. § 2000e-2.
43. Brian Headd, The Characteristics of Small-Business Employees,
MONTHLY LAB. REV., Apr. 2000, at 13–14, http://www.bls.gov/opub/mlr/2000/
04/art3full.pdf.
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With respect to the second requirement, there are no statistics that definitively identify the workers who face employment discrimination most frequently. However, statistics from
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) tell
us which types of discrimination charges are filed most frequently, a rough proxy for the types of discrimination that ac44
tually occur. From 1997 through 2014, the most frequently
45
filed discrimination charge type was race, followed by sex.
And though the EEOC’s publicly available data do not report
the specific types of sex and race discrimination at issue, as
Laura Beth Nielsen, Robert L. Nelson, and Ryon Lancaster
have observed, “[w]hile anti-discrimination law protects everyone, it largely is employed by members of traditionally disad46
vantaged groups . . . .” For example, in some surveys,
“[a]lmost one-third of African Americans report that they experienced discriminatory treatment in the last year at least once,
47
compared to a much smaller percentage of white workers.”
Likewise, women report sex discrimination and harassment at
48
a rate that is dramatically higher than men.
Thus, in filling in the right-hand circle in the Venn diagram in Figure 1, as a technical matter, all employees employed by covered employers, regardless of their particular
race, sex, national origin, color, or religion—approximately

44. All workers seeking to assert a claim under Title VII and other federal
antidiscrimination statutes must first file a discrimination charge with the
federal EEOC or its state equivalent. Filing a Charge of Discrimination,
EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/employees/charge.cfm (last visited Nov. 27, 2016).
45. Charge Statistics FY 1997 Through FY 2015, EEOC, https://www.eeoc
.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/charges.cfm (last visited Nov. 27, 2016).
46. Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 177.
47. Id. (citing K.A. DIXON ET AL., A WORKPLACE DIVIDED: HOW
AMERICANS VIEW DISCRIMINATION AND RACE ON THE JOB 11 (John J. Heldrich
Ctr. for Workforce Dev., Rutgers, State Univ. of N.J. eds., 2002), http://www
.heldrich.rutgers.edu/sites/default/files/products/uploads/A_Workplace_
Divided.pdf). Moreover, field experiments testing the rate at which potential
employers selected job applicants for further interviews have shown “highly
consistent” results across cities, “with Whites receiving positive responses at
roughly twice the rate of equally qualified Black applicants.” Devah Pager &
Bruce Western, Identifying Discrimination at Work: The Use of Field Experiments, 68 J. SOC. ISSUES 221, 226 (2012).
48. See, e.g., Joni Hersch, Compensating Differentials for Sexual Harassment, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 630, 632 (2011) (“Men’s risk of sexual harassment is
substantially below that of women at every age.”); Joel T. Nadler & Margaret
S. Stockdale, Workplace Gender Bias: Not Just Between Strangers, 14 N. AM.
J. PSYCHOL. 281, 281–84 (2012) (summarizing social science research on employment discrimination faced by women versus men).
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eighty-four percent of the workforce—could potentially experience job discrimination and bring a Title VII claim. However,
as the research suggests, and as anyone with a passing familiarity with the United States’ history of oppression and segregation would predict, the workers who occupy the right-hand circle are much more likely to be women and people of color.
D. ESTIMATING THE OVERLAP
Combining Roemer’s research with demographic data from
the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), then, we are able to
estimate the overlap between workers who may be misclassified and those who are most likely to become Title VII plaintiffs, defined here as women and workers of color. The BLS
provides data on the percent of each occupation held by women
and by workers who are Black or African American, Asian, and
49
Hispanic or Latino. These categories are not mutually exclusive—a Black worker can also be counted as Latino, for example—and we do not have statistics on the interactions between
the sex and race/ethnicity variables: the number of Black wom50
en in a particular occupation, for example.
Figure 4 below shows BLS demographic data for the eight
high misclassification occupations identified in Part I.B above,
illustrating whether the workers in those eight occupations are
also likely to be women and/or people of color. Some context is
useful in interpreting Figure 4. Overall, in 2014, women represented 46.9 percent of employed persons aged sixteen and
51
over. Black or African American workers represented 11.4
percent; Asian workers represented 5.7 percent; and Hispanic
52
or Latino workers represented 16.1 percent. These percentages are marked on Figure 4 with dashed lines. When the percentage of women or workers of color in one of the eight high
misclassification occupations exceeds their percentage in the
overall population of employed persons, we can conclude that
49. Labor Force Statistics, supra note 38.
50. Id.
51. Id. The analysis presented here uses a snapshot of the labor market
from 2014 as a rough proxy for the demographic profile of the workers who
held the occupations identified in Roemer’s work, and of the plaintiffs who are
captured in the court decision data presented below. A more extensive research project would employ a time series approach, in which misclassification
rates, worker demographics, and court decisions were all captured in the same
set of successive years. Lack of access to the underlying CPS and DER data
prevent this approach at present.
52. Id.
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those workers are overrepresented in that occupation. Table 2
then identifies each instance of overrepresentation by occupation.
Figure 4: Top Eight Occupations by Percentage and
Number of Workers Misclassified, with Worker Demographics by Occupation and by All Employed Persons
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Table 2: Top Eight Occupations by Percentage and
Number of Workers Misclassified, with Overrepresentation of Women, Black or African American, Asian, and
53
Hispanic or Latino Workers Noted
Overrepresentation in Occupation
Occupation

Judges, magistrates, and
other judicial workers

Women

Black or
African
American

Asian

Hispanic
or Latino

x

Lawyers
Clergy

x

Real estate brokers and
sales agents

x

Hairdressers, hairstylists,
and cosmetologists

x

x

Teacher assistants

x

x

Door-to-door sales workers,
news and street vendors,
and related workers

x

Maids and housekeeping
cleaners

x

x
x

x

x

Of the eight high misclassification occupations in Figure 4
and Table 2, women were overrepresented in six: real estate
brokers and sales agents; judges, magistrates, and other judicial workers; hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists;
maids and housekeeping cleaners; teacher assistants; and doorto-door sales workers, news and street vendors, and related
54
workers. In all six occupations, women held more than fifty
percent of jobs; in three (hairdressers, maids/housekeepers, and
teacher assistants), women represented close to or above ninety
55
percent of all workers.
With respect to workers of color, Black or African American
workers were overrepresented in three of the eight high misclassification occupations: hairdressers, hairstylists, and cos-

53. ROEMER, supra note 26; Labor Force Statistics, supra note 38.
54. Labor Force Statistics, supra note 38.
55. Women held 94.6 percent of hairdressing jobs, 88.6 percent of
maid/housekeeping jobs, and 90.3 percent of teacher assistant jobs. Id.
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metologists; maids and housekeeping cleaners; and teacher assistants. Asians were overrepresented as clergy only; Hispanic
or Latino workers were overrepresented as maids and housekeeping cleaners (representing almost forty-four percent of
workers in that occupation); teacher assistants; and door-todoor sales workers, news and street vendors, and related work56
ers.
Thus, drawing on Figure 4 and Table 2, we can see that
seven of the eight high misclassification occupations were held
disproportionately by women and/or workers of color, leaving
out only lawyers. Four of these occupations sit at the intersection of misclassification, race, and gender: hairdressers, maids
and housekeepers, teacher assistants, and door-to-door sales
workers and street vendors were all high misclassification occupations and held by outsize percentages of both women and
workers of color. All of these workers occupy the overlap space
in the Venn diagram in Figure 1; deprived of Title VII coverage
if they experience job discrimination, unless they can bring and
57
win a misclassification challenge in a Title VII lawsuit.
Returning, then, to the original question: to what extent is
misclassification being felt by women and people of color—
groups of workers who have historically faced discrimination?
In other words, is misclassification blocking Title VII from
56. Expanding beyond the eight occupations listed in Figure 4 and Table 2
to consider the other seven occupations in which at least ten percent of workers were misclassified, the BLS reports no demographic data for fishers and
related fishing workers and miscellaneous social scientists and related workers, two of the seven remaining occupations. Of the rest, women were
overrepresented (to the tune of 95.5 percent) among childcare workers. Black
or African American workers were overrepresented as barbers and, again,
childcare workers; Asian workers were overrepresented as dentists; Hispanic
or Latino workers were overrepresented as barbers; carpet, floor, and tile installers and finishers; and, in its third appearance, childcare workers. Of the
remaining seven occupations that ranked highest by number, rather than percent, of misclassified workers, Black or African American workers were
overrepresented as driver/sales workers and truck drivers; Asian workers
were overrepresented as marketing and sales managers and physicians and
surgeons; Hispanics or Latinos were overrepresented as carpenters; construction laborers; and driver/sales workers and truck drivers. Id.
57. One might argue that women and workers of color who hold jobs in
which they are overrepresented would be less, rather than more, likely to experience discrimination. However, the demographic statistics presented above
say nothing about the gender or race of the workers’ supervisors or managers;
it is therefore possible that a Latina housekeeper could experience discrimination at the hands of a supervisor with a different demographic profile. Moreover, discrimination does not need to occur across groups in order to be actionable; in-group discrimination can and does occur.
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reaching the workers it is intended to protect? The Roemer and
BLS results suggest that misclassification is both gendered and
raced, occurring in occupations in which women and/or people
of color are overrepresented. Again, the causes of this distribu58
tion are beyond this Article’s scope, but its effects seem clear:
to further weaken an already compromised antidiscrimination
regime by removing workers from its reach.
II. MISCLASSIFICATION CHALLENGES IN TITLE VII
CASES
The dire conclusion of the previous Section need not be
true, however, if misclassified workers who experience discrimination file suit under Title VII and argue successfully for reclassification as employees for purposes of the litigation. The
remainder of this Article therefore looks to the courts. Returning again to the Venn diagram in Figure 1, one can imagine
workers moving from the center overlap section into the circle
on the right side, shedding their misclassified status and becoming eligible for Title VII coverage. Little is known, however,
about whether the workers in the seven overlap occupations
listed above—the real estate agents, hairdressers, maids, and
others—actually make, and win, misclassification challenges in
Title VII cases. The analysis presented in the following Parts
seeks to describe those workers who make misclassification
challenges in federal district court, as well as those who win,
and to investigate why some plaintiffs are successful and some
are not.
A. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The data set examined here consists of all Title VII cases
filed in federal district courts over the ten years from 2005 to
2014, in which workers made misclassification arguments that
resulted in a decision available on Westlaw. After first receiv-

58. This Article does not delve into the extensive literature on occupational segregation by sex, race, and ethnicity. See generally William T. Bielby &
James N. Baron, Men and Women at Work: Sex Segregation and Statistical
Discrimination, 91 AM. J. SOC. 759 (1986) (discussing occupational segregation
by sex); Robert M. Blackburn, The Measurement of Occupational Segregation
and Its Component Dimensions, 15 INT’L J. SOC. RES. METHODOLOGY 175
(2012) (summarizing approaches to occupational segregation by sex); William
A. Darity Jr. & Patrick L. Mason, Evidence on Discrimination in Employment:
Codes of Color, Codes of Gender, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 63 (1998) (discussing occupational segregation by race and sex).
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59

ing training on coding protocols and completing research and
readings on the law of misclassification, two law student coders
ran an initial Westlaw search for the terms “advanced: (“title
vii” and “independent contractor”) & DA(aft 12-31-2004 & bef
60
01-01-2015)” in Westlaw’s federal district courts database.
The coders then reviewed each of the search results to determine whether it fit into the data set, i.e., whether the court engaged with the misclassification question directly or merely
mentioned the search terms in passing. Coders considered all
decisions available on Westlaw, not just those that were designated “published” with a Federal Reporter citation. Through
this process, coders identified 154 cases that were properly in
the data set, and then coded a variety of pieces of information
61
from each case, discussed further in the Sections below.
The law student coders worked as a pair, checking their
conclusions with one another, and then reported their findings
to the author during weekly meetings. In this sense, inter-coder
reliability cannot be measured, as coding decisions were made
by consensus. The author served as the arbiter of any differences of opinion, and also performed a final review and clean62
ing of the entire data set before analysis.

59. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, Coding Variables, in ENCYSOCIAL MEASUREMENT 321 (Kimberly Kempf-Leonard ed., 2004)
(describing good coding protocols).
60. That search produced 659 results, from which coders identified 154
cases that were properly in the data set. As part of this process, the coders
identified and removed thirty-three decisions that were duplicates, i.e., the
underlying case generated more than one opinion responsive to the search
terms that appeared among the original 659 search results. The goal of this
project was to code the district court’s final decision on misclassification;
therefore, preliminary decisions that addressed misclassification but were
then superseded by later decisions were struck from the data set.
61. Coders also identified cases in which courts addressed other reasons
that a worker might not be classified as an employee, because the worker was
a volunteer or an intern, for example. See, e.g., Day v. Jeannette Baseball
Ass’n, Civil Action No. 12-267, 2013 WL 5786457, at *3 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 28,
2013) (deciding whether “an unpaid volunteer baseball coach for a community
baseball league is entitled to protection against racial discrimination under
Title VII as an ‘employee’”). While these cases raise similar issues to those
cases in which a court decides between independent contractor and employee
status, they are excluded from the data examined here because courts use different legal tests to distinguish between employees and interns or volunteers
than between employees and independent contractors.
62. Other researchers have used similar methods in coding projects involving court decisions. See, e.g., Eden B. King et al., Discrimination in the
21st Century: Are Science and the Law Aligned?, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y L.
54, 63 (2011) (describing a consensus-based coding approach to court decisions
CLOPEDIA OF
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B. SELECTION EFFECTS
Though this data set is comprehensive as to all decisions
available via Westlaw during the ten-year study period, the data are limited by selection effects, which constrain generaliza63
bility from the results. In other words, the cases examined in
the coding process are not the entire universe of all possible
misclassification challenges brought by Title VII plaintiffs, nor
were they randomly chosen from that universe. Indeed, workers who did not make a claim; whose claims were abandoned,
settled privately, or resolved via the EEOC’s conciliation process before any federal court filing; workers who filed suit in
state court; and workers whose federal court decisions are not
available via Westlaw are not included in the present analy64
sis.
Nevertheless, these data remain useful for three reasons.
First, the subset of Title VII misclassification decisions that are
available via Westlaw have important precedential value.
Those that are published in a Federal Reporter are cited as authority by other federal and state courts in subsequent Title VII
misclassification cases; even those that carry only a Westlaw
involving discrimination issues).
63. See, e.g., PETER KENNEDY, A GUIDE TO ECONOMETRICS 265–67 (6th
ed. 2008) (discussing selection effects).
64. These sets of missing cases were not included due to nonexistent data
or data access difficulties. There are no records of employment discrimination
disputes that a plaintiff has abandoned or settled privately without ever filing
a lawsuit. Moreover, the EEOC does not track whether misclassification is an
issue in a worker’s charge, investigation, or conciliation. See Code Table for
EEOC Integrated Mission System (on file with author). The results of the
EEOC conciliation process are similarly inaccessible due to their confidentiality. See What You Should Know: The EEOC, Conciliation, and Litigation,
EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/newsroom/wysk/conciliation_litigation.cfm
(last visited Nov. 27, 2016) (describing the conciliation process as “an informal
and confidential [settlement] process”). Some state trial court decisions are
available via Westlaw, but very few. For example, a search of all state trial
court decisions and orders on Westlaw using the same search terms and time
period yielded only two in which the court considered a misclassification challenge in a Title VII context. The plaintiff ’s Title VII claims survived in one
case and did not in the other. Taylor v. Vestuto, No. A543723, 2011 WL
2357449, at *9–10 (D. Nev. Mar. 8, 2011) (deeming plaintiff an employee for
Title VII purposes); Cramer v. Cutner, Index No. 61443/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 29, 2012) (finding plaintiff to be an independent contractor for Title VII
purposes). However, two is too small a pool of cases from which to draw any
useful conclusions. Finally, while federal court decisions that are not available
via Westlaw could theoretically be accessed by searching federal district
courts’ dockets directly using the PACER system, such a project would be prohibitively laborious and expensive.
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citation are cited in legal briefs and court opinions. The decisions in this data set also have a spillover effect on two other
Title VII analyses that are closely related to the misclassification question: whether an employer has the appropriate num66
ber of “employees” (fifteen) for Title VII coverage purposes,
and whether a worker may sue more than one putative employ67
er under Title VII. Finally, the cases studied here serve as
precedent for misclassification decisions in lawsuits under the
68
Americans with Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in
69
70
Employment Act, and many state law analogs, all of which
are analyzed in pari materia with Title VII.
Second, and similarly, the cases that resolve via private
settlement or the EEOC’s conciliation process, and so fall out of
the data before reaching federal court, are likely influenced by
the outcomes of the litigated cases in this data set. This is because settlement bargaining occurs, famously, in the shadow of
71
the law. In this conception, parties’ attempts to resolve their
65. See, e.g., Shah v. Deaconess Hosp., 355 F.3d 496, 499 (6th Cir. 2004)
(citing Chadha v. Hardin Mem’l Hosp., No. 99-3166, 2000 WL 32023, at *2
(6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2000)).
66. See, e.g., Williams v. Anchorage Marina, No. Civ. CCB-05-2855, 2006
WL 470603, at *1 (D. Md. Feb. 27, 2006) (deciding employment status of five
workers who would count toward required fifteen minimum if deemed employees rather than independent contractors).
67. See Charlotte S. Alexander, Direct and Indirect Employment Under
Title VII, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK UNIVERSITY 68TH ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR: WHO IS AN EMPLOYEE, AND WHO IS THE EMPLOYER?,
(Kati Griffith ed.) (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author) (manuscript at 5–9)
(explaining courts’ comingling of joint employment and misclassification analyses).
68. See, e.g., Doud v. Yellow Cab of Reno, Inc., No. 3:13-cv-00664-WGC,
2015 WL 5533381, at *2 (D. Nev. Sept. 18, 2015) (citing Title VII cases in discussing employee-independent contractor distinction in ADA case).
69. See, e.g., Vahid v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 985 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1007–08
(S.D. Iowa 2013) (using the same analysis to determine whether a worker was
an employee or independent contractor for purposes of Title VII and the
ADEA).
70. See, e.g., D’Annunzio v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 891 A.2d 673, 677
(N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2006) (using Title VII case law defining employee
and independent contractor status to decide a dispute under the state Law
Against Discrimination); Gover v. Royal Comm. Consultants, Inc., Index No.
118987/06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Aug. 21, 2007) (stating in case involving employee or
independent contractor status under the New York State and City Human
Rights Laws, “[t]hus, for all intents and purposes, cases construing Title VII
can be relied upon by the court in construing the local statutes relied upon by
the plaintiff”).
71. See generally Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982);
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disputes outside of court are heavily influenced by their calculation of the odds of winning should they proceed to court. Federal courts’ treatment of misclassification disputes in Title VII
cases provides data with which parties estimate their odds of
victory, which in turn influences the positions they take during
negotiations. Again, understanding the way in which federal
courts dispose of Title VII misclassification disputes is important not only for understanding those cases resolved via litigation, but likely also for those resolved out of court.
Third, we can learn something from making educated
guesses about the magnitude and direction of the selection effects. That is to say, given what we know independently about
the occupational distribution of misclassification (the data presented above in Part I), we can hypothesize about the direction
and magnitude of the selection bias in the litigation data examined here. We can thus get a sense of which misclassified workers who experience discrimination take their claims to federal
court, and which drop out of the data set. This is an important
contribution in and of itself, speaking to how well workers are
able to use the court system to redress workplace rights violations. These topics are discussed more fully in connection with
the descriptive statistics presented in the next Section.
C. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS AND SELECTION EFFECTS
REVISITED
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 in the appendix report descriptive statistics for all variables collected by the coders. This Section discusses some key findings and returns to the subject of selection
effects. With respect to the main variable of interest, misclassification outcomes, approximately sixty-six percent of plaintiffs
72
lost, ending their Title VII claims completely. Of the surviving
Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).
72. Here, a misclassification “win” is defined as any case in which the
plaintiff had the opportunity to proceed with his or her Title VII claim. This
includes cases in which the court addressed the misclassification issue on
summary judgment and affirmatively deemed the plaintiff an employee
(granting a plaintiff ’s motion for summary judgment) or declared the question
still in dispute (denying a defendant’s motion for summary judgment). Plaintiff misclassification “wins” also include cases in which a court denied a defendant’s motion to dismiss or granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss without
prejudice, both of which preserved the plaintiff ’s ability to continue with the
litigation or amend his or her complaint to correct pleading deficiencies. A
misclassification “loss,” on the other hand, signifies a total loss, in which the
court either granted a defendant’s motion to dismiss with prejudice or found
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fifty-three plaintiffs’ Title VII claims, approximately sixty-four
percent ultimately settled; twenty-three percent lost on later
pretrial motions or at trial; and six percent—only three cases—
ended in at least a partial plaintiff ’s win. (Four cases, or approximately eight percent, were still open at the time that coding was completed.) When Title VII outcomes are calculated for
the whole data set of 154 cases, including both misclassification
wins and losses, seventy-three percent of plaintiffs lost, twentytwo percent settled, two percent won, and three percent of cases
73
were still open.
These plaintiff success rates align generally with those
found in other empirical studies of Title VII plaintiffs’ fate in
federal court, though they also reveal some interesting differences. For instance, in Nielsen and her co-authors’ work, the
authors found that forty percent of plaintiffs lost their Title VII
claims, fifty-eight percent of cases settled, and two percent of
74
plaintiffs ultimately won at trial. In comparison, in this Article’s data, seventy-three percent of all plaintiffs lost their Title
VII claims, twenty-two percent of cases settled, and two percent
of plaintiffs ultimately won. While these differences could be
explained by differences in the two studies’ data and methodol75
ogy, the lower overall plaintiff loss rates in Nielsen et al.’s
work might suggest the rather obvious conclusion that Title VII
plaintiffs who must overcome a misclassification challenge face
a harder task than Title VII plaintiffs as a general matter. The
misclassification inquiry thus appears to be acting as a substantial hurdle for Title VII plaintiffs.
the plaintiff to be an independent contractor on summary judgment. In all instances, coders searched the underlying court docket for motions for reconsideration and appeals to ensure that they captured the court’s final disposition
of the misclassification question, even if the decision available on Westlaw did
not represent the final disposition.
73. It is possible that the plaintiffs who lost on the misclassification question or on their underlying Title VII claims recovered under some other statute, such as a state antidiscrimination law or 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1991), but the
coding process did not capture those results.
74. Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 186–87. In comparison, in their study of
employment discrimination cases filed in federal courts between 1979 and
2006, Kevin Clermont and Stewart Schwab report an overall plaintiff win rate
of fifteen percent. Clermont & Schwab, supra note 8, at 127.
75. Nielsen et al. examined case filing data rather than judicial decisions
available via Westlaw. They assembled and coded a random sample of 1672
closed employment discrimination cases filed in seven U.S. district courts between 1998 and 2003. They also conducted interviews with plaintiffs, defendants, and lawyers and examined charge filing data from the EEOC. Nielsen et
al., supra note 8, at 181 (describing data and methodology).
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However, comparing the outcome statistics for the plaintiffs who survived a misclassification challenge in this Article’s
data set with the Nielsen et al. data also suggests some interesting implications. The surviving plaintiffs in the data set
studied here went on to lose twenty-three percent of their Title
VII claims, settle sixty-four percent, and win six percent. In
comparison, the larger pool of all antidiscrimination plaintiffs
in the Nielsen data suffered a higher loss rate of forty percent,
a comparable settlement rate of fifty-eight percent, and a lower
76
win rate of two percent. It is not known how many of the Nielsen cases involved misclassification claims, so we are unable to
make an apples-to-apples comparison. Yet the data do suggest
that those plaintiffs who survive beyond a misclassification
challenge ultimately do better with their underlying Title VII
claims. This is slightly puzzling: there is no reason that strong
discrimination evidence would necessarily co-occur with strong
misclassification evidence, unless one assumes that some employers take the low road with respect to all of their employment practices. Therefore, there may be factors other than the
merits at work here—attorney skill, perhaps, or chance.
Descriptive statistics also give us a picture of the plaintiff
characteristics in the data set, allowing us to explore and hypothesize about selection effects. If our data set did capture the
full universe of misclassified Title VII plaintiffs, then we would
expect the occupational profiles of the plaintiffs to resemble
those in the overlap area in the Venn diagram above in Figure
1: the workers in the seven occupations held disproportionately
by women and/or people of color who were also at high risk for
misclassification and/or accounted for the largest numbers of
misclassified workers. This is because, on the one hand, we
would expect occupations with large percentages of misclassified workers who are women and/or people of color to generate
misclassification challenges, because those plaintiffs are likely
to have strong misclassification claims on the merits. On the
other hand, we would also expect occupations that employ large
numbers of misclassified workers to generate lawsuits involving misclassification challenges due to their numbers alone.
Recall that these seven overlap occupations were real estate
brokers and sales agents; clergy; judges, magistrates, and other
judicial workers; hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists;
maids and housekeeping cleaners; teacher assistants; and door-

76. Id. at 186–87.
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to-door sales workers, news and street vendors, and related
77
workers.
Of these occupations, four appeared in the data set: real estate and door-to-door sales workers each brought three cases
(1.95 percent of all cases in the data set); clergy and judges/judicial workers filed one case (0.65 percent) apiece. Hairdressers, maids and housekeepers, and teacher assistants—
jobs in which both women and workers of color were overrepresented—did not appear in the data set at all. More generally,
the data set was skewed toward white-collar occupations, with
over two-thirds of plaintiffs holding white-collar jobs. Figure 5
shows the top ten occupations in the data set, all of which ap78
peared in at least three cases.
Figure 5: Top Ten Occupations in Data Set by Percent
Representation

Note: N=154

77. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
78. The presence of the “lifeguards, recreational, protective service” occupation may be slightly misleading, explained by a repeat plaintiff or plaintiffs.
In four of the five cases in that occupational category, a group of plaintiffs who
had worked as school sports referees sued the same two school districts for
discrimination and argued for reclassification as employees rather than independent contractors. Lanier v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:11-CV-01613LJO-GSA, 2013 WL 1904822 (E.D. Cal. May 7, 2013); Quintero v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:12-CV-00675-LJO-GSA, 2013 WL 268704 (E.D. Cal. Jan.
24, 2013); Earl v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., No. F CV 11-1568LJO-GSA, 2012 WL 2798806 (E.D. Cal. July 9, 2012); Quintero v. Clovis Unified Sch. Dist., No. 1:12-CV-00676-AWI-BAM, 2012 WL 2050736 (E.D. Cal.
June 6, 2012).
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Though it is difficult to draw concrete conclusions from
these small numbers, we can hypothesize that some workers’
presence in or absence from the data might be explained by
workers’ access to the money, time, and legal knowledge necessary to sue. The author’s previous empirical work has suggested that the lower a worker is on the socio-economic scale, the
less likely he or she is to resolve workplace problems via litiga79
tion. The prevalence of white-collar workers in the data set—
including the high-misclassification real estate, clergy, and
judge/judicial worker occupations—is consistent with this observation, as is the absence of the lowest paid of the seven over80
lap occupations, maids and housekeepers. Indeed, the most
frequent of all occupations to appear in the data set, physicians
81
and surgeons, is also one of the highest paid in the country.
Moreover, the weighted average of the national median hourly
wages of all forty occupations on the Roemer list—those in
which at least one percent of workers appeared to be misclassified—is $26.07, while that same figure for the occupations rep82
resented in the set of cases filed in court is the higher $32.28.

79. Charlotte S. Alexander & Arthi Prasad, Bottom-Up Workplace Law
Enforcement: An Empirical Analysis, 89 IND. L.J. 1069, 1072–73 (2014) (finding, based on analysis of over 4300 worker interviews, that “legal knowledge
. . . appears to decrease with a worker’s relative power and stability, and many
workers simply may not have the information necessary to become workplace
law enforcers” and that forty-three percent of workers who had experienced a
recent problem on the job decided not to make a claim against their employer,
primarily due to fear of retaliation and doubts about the efficacy of the claiming process).
80. According to 2014 data available from the Bureau of Labor Statistics,
the national hourly median wage for maids and housekeepers was $9.67. May
2014 National Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, United States,
U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://www.bls.gov/oes/
2014/may/oes_nat.htm (last visited Nov. 27, 2016) [hereinafter May 2014 Estimates].
81. In a typical case brought by a physician or surgeon, the plaintiff alleged discrimination against a hospital at which he or she had privileges, and
the hospital denied that the plaintiff was a hospital employee, as opposed to
an independent contractor. See, e.g., Brintley v. St. Mary Mercy Hosp., 904 F.
Supp. 2d 699, 705 (E.D. Mich. 2012). Note that, due to physicians’ and surgeons’ high salaries, any recovery keyed to their earnings, such as backpay,
would be quite high, making the costs of litigation in terms of time and investment worthwhile. Moreover, highly paid workers in this occupation could
likely afford a specialist attorney, further signaling the high value and strong
merits of the case to the court.
82. A weighted average takes into account the number of workers in each
occupation as well as the wage earned. Wage figures are drawn from BLS statistics. May 2014 Estimates, supra note 80.
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Thus, returning to the Venn diagram in Figure 1, we can
conclude, albeit tentatively, that not all workers in the seven
overlap occupations attempt a move rightward, toward Title
VII coverage. On the whole, the plaintiffs who do seek reclassification and redress for discrimination are white-collar workers
like physicians and surgeons, not the lower-paid maids and
hairdressers who experience misclassification at higher rates.
While these blue-collar workers could have fallen out of the data set because they settled or conciliated their cases prior to filing in federal court—or filed in state court instead—previous
research suggests that these workers more likely stayed silent,
or chose to leave their jobs, instead of exercising their Title VII
rights in court.
III. REGRESSION DESIGN, PREDICTIONS FROM
THEORY, AND RESULTS
This Part turns from those workers who were absent from
the data to those who were present, first describing the regression design and variables used in the analysis of misclassification outcomes, then discussing three theories that might predict or explain those outcomes, and, finally, presenting the
regression results.
A. VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
The dependent variable in this analysis—the primary result that the coding project attempts to describe and explain—
is the outcome of the plaintiffs’ misclassification challenges. For
each case in the data set, coders also recorded a set of independent variables describing characteristics of the litigants, the
claims in the lawsuit and the misclassification decision itself,
and the court and judge. These variables allow exploration of
whether certain types of litigants, certain types of claims,
and/or certain types of judges appear to influence the outcome
83
of misclassification challenges.
With respect to the plaintiff, we coded whether he or she
was represented by an attorney and, if so, an attorney special84
izing in employment, labor, or civil rights law; the plaintiff ’s

83. The choice and construction of these variables was guided by previous
empirical work by Laura Beth Nielsen and her co-authors on the fate of Title
VII cases in federal court. Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at app. (listing variables).
84. The specialist attorney designation was determined by looking at each
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occupation, and whether it was blue or white-collar; the percent
and number of misclassified workers in the plaintiff ’s occupation, per the Roemer data; and the percent of women, Black or
African American, Asian, and Hispanic or Latino workers in
the plaintiff ’s occupation, per the BLS data. Regarding the defendant, we coded the industry: trucking, construction, maintenance; retail; manufacturing, agriculture; package delivery;
school, university; medical, health, social services; media, entertainment; government; and financial services, insurance,
85
other professional services. We also coded descriptors of the
lawsuit and misclassification decision, noting the type(s) of dis86
crimination asserted, fact pattern(s) giving rise to the Title
87
VII claim(s), the legal test used by the court (no test, common
88
law test, hybrid test), whether the court referred to a written
contract between the parties in its misclassification decision,
and the year the misclassification decision was made. Finally,
with respect to the judge and court issuing the misclassification
decision, we coded the deciding judge’s imputed political ideology and the circuit in which the deciding district court was lo89
cated.

plaintiff attorney’s website. If the attorney or firm listed employment, labor, or
civil rights law as one of its practice areas, it was designated a “specialist.”
85. In order to minimize the number of independent variables due to the
small number of observations in this data set, defendant industry variables
were not used in the regression described below, but are reported in Table 6.1
in the Appendix of this Article. The plaintiff occupation variables that were
included in the regression likely capture much of the same information contained in the defendant industry variable.
86. Claim types were race, sex, religion, national origin, color discrimination, and retaliation. Each case may have more than one claim type. Because
of their small number of observations, claims for religious, national origin, and
color discrimination are grouped into one “other discrimination” variable for
purposes of this analysis.
87. Fact patterns were failure to hire, termination, and harassment or
other discriminatory conditions of work. Each case may have more than one
fact pattern.
88. See infra Part III.B.1 for explanations of these tests.
89. The presiding judge’s political ideology is imputed from the political
party of the judge’s nominating President. This is a common technique in research on judges’ decisions. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN ET AL., ARE JUDGES
POLITICAL?: AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 5–6 (2006)
(using political party of a judge’s nominating president as a proxy for a judge’s
own political ideology).
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B. PREDICTIONS FROM THEORY
This Section sets out predictions for the associations between the independent and dependent variables, drawing on
three theories about the drivers of litigation outcomes in civil
cases generally, and in cases involving discrimination allegations and/or contract disputes specifically. These theories are
not mutually exclusive—the goal here is not to pick a “winner”
among theories—but they do provide a useful set of lenses
through which to view the results.
1. Legal Formalism
In their study of the outcomes of Title VII cases in federal
court, Laura Beth Nielsen and her co-authors describe legal
formalism in employment discrimination cases as:
[H]old[ing] that legal outcomes should reflect the law on the books.
The outcome of a case should be determined by how well a plaintiff
meets the formal requirements for making and proving a claim of discrimination. Because different theories of discrimination require different elements of proof, ceteris paribus, a formal legal model suggests that there will be variation in plaintiff success across different
90
legal claims.

Richard Posner elaborates that formalism refers to:
[T]he use of deductive logic to derive the outcome of a case from premises accepted as authoritative. Formalism enables a commentator to
pronounce the outcome of the case as being correct or incorrect, in approximately the same way that the solution to a mathematical prob91
lem can be pronounced correct or incorrect.

A legal formalist would thus predict that the law on the books
matters to case outcomes, that different legal tests will produce
different outcomes in a predictable way that aligns with some
measure of the strength of the merits.
However, none of the independent variables coded in this
project purports to measure the merits of a plaintiff ’s misclassification challenge as a way to pronounce misclassification outcomes “correct” or “incorrect” as a matter of legal formalism.
Other researchers have used various proxies to assess a claim’s
92
merits, but constructing such a variable is extremely difficult.

90. Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 178.
91. Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179, 181
(1986).
92. Nielsen et al. provide an insightful summary of the difficulties in attempting to code the quality of a case:

938

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[101:907

Some of the independent variables listed above may capture
something about merits: the fact that a plaintiff is pro se may
suggest that his or her case is particularly weak, and that no
attorney would sign on; a specialist attorney’s presence in a
case might signal that the attorney judges the merits to be par93
ticularly strong.
Likewise, misclassification claims by workers in occupations with high percentages of misclassified workers, per Roemer, might be predicted to have greater success, as they might
be strong on the merits. However, even the occupation most at
risk for misclassification on Roemer’s list, real estate sales
workers, had a misclassification rate of less than fifty percent,
so there is no guarantee that any given real estate sales plaintiff in this data set fell into the fifty percent who were misclassified. Moreover, as discussed above, the Roemer list relies on
self-reported classifications, which may or may not align with a
court’s assessment of a worker’s true employment classification
under Title VII law.
Nevertheless, if legal formalists are correct that the merits
of a case can be ascertained and judged as an objective matter
against a given set of legal requirements, then we may see increasing misclassification success rates in cases brought by attorneys and specialist attorneys, and perhaps also in cases
brought by plaintiffs in occupations at great risk of misclassifi-

It is important to note that we attempted in the coding of case files to
construct valid measures of what can be conceived of as a latent or
unmeasured variable of the “quality” of a case. Several of our
measures might capture aspects of this variable, including the index
of legal effort, the outcome of a case in the EEOC, and the EEOC priority code, but none is definitive. We attempted, without success, to
have coders provide a subjective rating of the strength of a case, but
we learned that there are inherent limitations to case files as a source
of indicators about the “merits” of a case. Unlike some medical malpractice research in which medical records can be sent to medical professionals to assess, the merits of the case in employment discrimination depend on subjective assessments of job performance and the
meaning of employer actions. Even where such records were included
in the file, there is no standard for keeping employment records that
would allow us to evaluate personnel files like a medical professional
can do using agreed upon standards of care. We coded sets of documents constructed by the adversarial process of which they are a
part. The relationship between those documents and a “good” or “bad”
case are difficult to discern.
Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 182.
93. Id. at 189 (“The powerful effect of legal representation might be explained as a selection effect. That is, obtaining legal representation reveals an
otherwise unmeasured variable of quality of case.”).
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cation, though both variables are extremely rough merits prox94
ies.
In addition, if legal formalists are right that differing legal
requirements should produce differing outcomes, then we
would expect to see different misclassification win rates depending on the test a court uses to determine a worker’s proper
status. Courts use one of two multi-factored rubrics: the common law approach, which adopts the principles of agency law
and focuses primarily on the employer’s right to control the putative employee; or the hybrid common law-economic realities
test, which considers both an employer’s control and, more
broadly, the relationship of economic dependence between
95
worker and employer. Because the common law test is generally perceived to be the more restrictive of the two, one would
predict that misclassification challenges subject to that analy96
sis would fail more frequently.
However, some commentators, including the authors of the
new Restatement (Third) of Employment Law, have concluded
that there is actually little difference in practice between the
97
tests for employee status. If the Restatement is correct in its
characterization of the law, any difference between the two
tests may actually dissolve when applied, and we should see no
94. The critical realist, however, might interpret such results as evidence
of the attorneys’ signaling of plaintiff power and status, not of (or in addition
to) the underlying merits of a case. See infra Part III.B.3.
95. Compare Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323–24
(1992) (discussing the common law test), and Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence
v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52 (1989) (discussing the same), with Oestman v.
Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Co., 958 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir. 1992) (“The hybrid
test, which is most often applied to actions under Title VII, is a combination of
the economic realities test and the common law right to control test.”), and
EEOC v. Zippo Mfg. Co., 713 F.2d 32, 38 (3d Cir. 1983) (“Consequently, the
hybrid standard that combines the common law ‘right to control’ with the ‘economic realities’ as applied in Title VII cases is the correct standard . . . .”).
96. See, e.g., Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc., 162 F.3d 1062, 1069 (10th Cir.
1998) (contrasting the “stringent” common law approach with the more permissive economic reality factors that are incorporated into the hybrid test).
97. As the Restatement puts it, “Decisions interpreting the meaning of
employee under the federal antidiscrimination laws illustrate the lack of any
sharp distinction between the common-law test, at least as formulated in Reid
and Darden, and a multifactor economic-realities test.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF EMPLOYMENT LAW § 1.01 cmt. d–e (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Final Draft
2014) (“The antidiscrimination-law decisions thus highlight the broad common
ground covered by the common-law test and the economic-realities test in determining whether or not to classify a service provider as an employee.” (citing
Murray v. Principal Fin. Group, Inc., 613 F.3d 943, 945 (9th Cir. 2010)
(“[T]here is no functional difference between the . . . formulations.”))).
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difference in the outcomes of misclassification challenges subject to the two tests. If, however, there is a meaningful distinction between the two tests in practice, and if the legal formalists are correct, then the “test” independent variable may exert
an influence on misclassification outcomes.
2. Contractual Formalism
A second theory that might hold predictive value in misclassification cases is contractual formalism. Contractual formalism holds that the words of a contract matter, and that
judges should hew strictly to the text in matters of interpreta98
tion. Viewing misclassification cases through this lens, one
would expect courts to pay a great deal of attention to the details of the contract, if any, between the parties, to determine
the true nature of their relationship. In fact, some courts’ formulations of the common law test have developed to include a
formalistic element. Courts in the Fourth Circuit consider the
parties’ “mutual intent to create an independent contractor re99
lationship.” Courts in other circuits also commonly consider
the parties’ beliefs about their relationship, as evidenced by the
100
existence of a written contract.
98. Ralph James Mooney, The New Conceptualism in Contract Law, 74
OR. L. REV. 1131, 1171 (1995) (describing formalism as historically holding up
“the precise word . . . as the sovereign talisman” (quoting Wood v. Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 (N.Y. 1917))).
99. Cilecek v. Inova Health Sys. Servs., 115 F.3d 256, 262–63 (4th Cir.
1997).
100. See, e.g., Vakharia v. Swedish Covenant Hosp., 190 F.3d 799, 805–06
(7th Cir. 1999) (finding the plaintiff ’s status as an independent contractor,
and therefore not an employee, was “confirmed” by an agreement between the
parties expressly referring to the plaintiff as an “independent contractor”);
Lockyer v. AXA Advisors, L.L.C., No. 2:10-CV-00678, 2010 WL 4612040, at *3
(D. Utah Oct. 12, 2010) (“[T]he Agent Agreement establishes that plaintiff was
an independent contractor with the AXA Network.”); Kravis v. Karr Barth
Assoc., Civil Action No. 09-485, 2010 WL 337646, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 26,
2010) (“In evaluating whether or not Kravis qualifies as an employee, the
Court will first consider the intent of the parties, as evinced by the contract
Kravis signed to become a Sales Agent with Defendants. Where parties have
reduced their agreement to writing, courts may ascertain the parties’ intent by
examining the writing.”); DeSouza v. EGL Eagle Global Logistics LP, 596 F.
Supp. 2d 456, 464 (D. Conn. 2009) (“[T]he Court notes that contractual language ‘fixing the relationship between [the plaintiff and the defendant], although not dispositive, provides strong evidence of the parties’ intentions.’”
(quoting Taracido v. United States, 93 Civ. 8266(LLS), 94 Civ. 3062(LLS),
1995 WL 217525, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 12, 1995))); Taylor v. BP Express, Inc.,
No. CV 407-182, 2008 WL 5046071, at *5 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 24, 2008) (“[C]ontract
provisions that refer to Plaintiff as a ‘contractor’ must be given great weight.”).
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However, the law of employee status has a conflicted relationship with contractual formalism. Though some courts view
written contracts between the parties as evidence of a worker’s
true status, others are clear that the existence of a written contract is not dispositive of the nature of the employment rela101
Indeed, courts in misclassification cases widely
tionship.
state the proposition that “an employer may not avoid Title VII
by affixing a label to a person that does not capture the sub102
stance of the employment relationship.” The idea is that employers should not be permitted unilaterally to classify workers
in such a way as to avoid antidiscrimination obligations; the fox
should not, after all, guard the hen house. Courts are thus instructed to disregard labels and instead to consider the facts of
the relationship between the hiring and hired parties. Courts
that disregard the existence of written contracts in misclassification cases extend this rule rejecting unilateral labels to bilateral contracts as well. Courts that pay close attention to the existence of a written contract take the opposite position,
adopting a contractual formalist stance.
The independent variable that captures whether a court referred to a written contract between the parties should therefore reveal interesting results about the extent to which courts
rely on written contracts in their misclassification decisions,
and whether that reliance is correlated with success or failure
for the plaintiffs, all else equal.
101. See, e.g., Hunt v. Mo. Dep’t of Corr., 297 F.3d 735, 741 (8th Cir. 2002)
(noting that when determining whether an individual is an employee or independent contractor for Title VII purposes, courts are cautioned against relying
on the existence of a contract that refers to a party as an independent contractor); Allen v. U.S. Sec’y of Def., No. 4:10CV1928 FRB, 2012 WL 401062, at *4
(E.D. Mo. Feb. 8, 2012) (discussing the same); Feldmann v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,
No. 4:09CV2129MLM, 2011 WL 382201, at *8 (E.D. Mo. Feb. 3, 2011) (“The
existence of a contract referring to a party as an independent contractor does
not end the inquiry.” (quoting Schweiger v. Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Neb., 207
F.3d 480, 483 (8th Cir. 2000))).
102. Devine v. Stone, Leyton & Gershman, P.C., 100 F.3d 78, 81 (8th Cir.
1996); see also, e.g., Davis v. N.Y. Sports Officials’ Council, No. 7:09-CV-0514
GTS/GHL, 2010 WL 3909688, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2010) (“[C]ourts in this
circuit look ‘beyond mere labels in assessing whether defendant is an employer, and apply the common law of agency to determine whether an individual is
an independent contractor or an employee for purposes of Title VII . . . .’”
(quoting Deshpande v. Medisys Health Network, Inc., No. 07-CV-0375, 2010
WL 1539745, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2010))); Bigalke v. Neenah Foundry
Co., No. 05-C-29, 2006 WL 1663717, at *2 (E.D. Wis. June 9, 2006)
(“[A]llowing employers’ verbiage and ipse dixit to be outcome determinative
would allow employers to evade Title VII entirely simply by using the term
‘independent contractor’ when the individual is really an employee.”).
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3. Critical Realism
The third possible explanatory theory is critical realism.
Again returning to Nielsen and her co-authors:
The critical realist sees the social organization of litigation systematically working against certain parties and social groups. Plaintiffs, as
one-shot litigants, are at a serious disadvantage compared to defendants, who more often are repeat players. Socially privileged groups, in
better-paying jobs, with more education, with more influence within
the work organization, will convert these social resources into legal
resources. As a result, they should enjoy greater success in litiga103
tion.

Thus, unlike the two formalist theories summarized above, according to critical realism, the law and the contract do not matter to litigation outcomes as much as the identity and status of
the parties to the litigation and the social context within which
a lawsuit unfolds.
Here, one might predict two results if critical realism is at
work. First, one might observe lower misclassification win rates
by plaintiffs in blue-collar occupations and in occupations with
high percentages of women and people of color—those with
lower social status and less power to bend litigation results in
their favor. One might also observe more plaintiff wins in decisions made by Democrat-appointed judges. Though it is not
clear that a misclassification decision is itself ideological, the
misclassification question might be seen as crucial to the project of keeping the courts open to employment discrimination
plaintiffs, a view perhaps more associated with politically liberal Democratic appointees.
Second, the critical realist might predict a bias against
plaintiffs whose underlying substantive Title VII claims are
generally disfavored by the courts—here, perhaps race and national origin discrimination plaintiffs. At first glance, a plaintiff ’s allegations of a particular kind of discrimination would
seem to be unrelated to the plaintiff ’s allegations about her
proper employment classification. Nevertheless, other research
has established that race and national origin discrimination
cases, as compared to cases alleging other types of discrimina104
tion, fare particularly poorly in court. Previous work by this
103. Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 180.
104. See, e.g., David Benjamin Oppenheimer, Verdicts Matter: An Empirical Study of California Employment Discrimination and Wrongful Discharge
Jury Verdicts Reveals Low Success Rates for Women and Minorities, 37 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 511, 516 (2003) (reporting low success rates in jury trials in discrimination cases filed by women and minorities); Wendy Parker, Lessons in
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author with Camille Gear Rich and Zev Eigen has also hypothesized about the effects of a post-racial ideology—the idea that
“true” racism rarely occurs any more—in shaping judges’ and
105
juries’ views of race discrimination claims as meritless. It is
possible, therefore, that judges might use the misclassification
decision as an early way to rid their dockets of race and national origin discrimination cases that they view as nuisance
claims. Indeed, former U.S. District Court Judge Nancy
Gertner relates that federal judges are explicitly coached to
find procedural and other grounds for early dismissal in order
to eliminate complex and time-consuming employment discrim106
ination cases from their dockets. Thus, critical realism would
predict greater losses on the misclassification question for
plaintiffs who are themselves less wealthy and powerful, who
bring disfavored claims of discrimination, and whose cases are
adjudicated by politically conservative judges.
It bears repeating that these three theories may both complement and contradict one another in interesting ways; they
are presented here to provide a loose framework for analysis
and a set of possible views on the regression results, not as a
way to prove which theory is more “right” than the others. We
turn, then, to the data.

Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 893
(2006) (presenting data on race discrimination plaintiffs’ losses in federal
court).
105. Camille Gear Rich et al., Post-Racial Hydraulics: The Hidden Dangers
of the Universal Turn, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2016) (describing the hypothetical
by Camille Gear Rich and Zev Eigen); see also Mark W. Bennett, Essay: From
the “No Spittin’, No Cussin’ and No Summary Judgment” Days of Employment
Discrimination Litigation to the “Defendant’s Summary Judgment Affirmed
Without Comment” Days: One Judge’s Four-Decade Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH.
L. REV. 685, 705 (2013) (“The implications of post-racialism beliefs, to the extent that these views taint judges’ perceptions of employment discrimination
cases, are extremely problematic for current summary judgment practices.”);
Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So Hard To Win?,
61 LA. L. REV. 555, 556 (2001) (“When it comes to race cases, which are generally the most difficult claim for a plaintiff to succeed on, courts often seem
mired in a belief that the claims are generally unmeritorious, brought by
whining plaintiffs who have been given too many, not too few, breaks along
the way.”).
106. Nancy Gertner, Losers’ Rules, 122 YALE L.J.F. 109, 117 (2012) (“At the
start of my judicial career in 1994, the trainer teaching discrimination law to
new judges announced, ‘Here’s how to get rid of civil rights cases,’ and went on
to recite a litany of [strategies].”).
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C. REGRESSION RESULTS
Table 3 below reports regression results. The analysis here
uses logistic regression to identify statistically significant associations between the independent variables coded from each
case and the dependent variable—the outcome of plaintiffs’
107
misclassification challenges. Regression allows us to estimate
the strength of any association between, for example, specialist
attorney representation and a misclassification win, holding all
other variables constant. Measuring statistical significance is
necessary to determine whether associations that appear between variables are reliable, or whether they are actually a re108
sult of measurement or other error.
107. See JEFFREY M. WOOLDRIDGE, INTRODUCTORY ECONOMETRICS: A
MODERN APPROACH 68 (4th ed. 2009) (explaining multiple regression analysis
as allowing the researcher to “explicitly control for many other factors that
simultaneously affect the dependent variable”). Because the dependent variable here can take only two values (the plaintiff wins or loses on the misclassification question), this analysis employs logistic regression, or logit. However,
the output, or coefficients, produced by a logistic regression equation are extremely difficult to interpret. This Article follows other empirical legal scholarship in transforming the regression coefficients into marginal effects, holding all other variables at their means, which better lend themselves to
interpretation. Consistent with Epstein and others, Table 3 thus reports marginal effects in the “Coefficient” column. See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL JUDGES: A THEORETICAL & EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 22 (2013) (describing use of
marginal effects at means and reporting of transformed coefficients). As an
alternative to logit, other researchers prefer the probit model; still others, particularly in applied economics, advocate using the linear probability model
(LPM). See LEE EPSTEIN & ANDREW D. MARTIN, AN INTRODUCTION TO EMPIRICAL LEGAL RESEARCH 215–21 (2014) (discussing choice of logit model for regressions involving binary dependent variables). Following common practice in
empirical legal scholarship, logit was used to produce the results discussed below, though, notably, the set of statistically significant results produced by
running logit, probit, and LPM here differs only slightly. See Marc F.
Bellemare, Love It or Logit, or: Man, People *Really* Care About Binary Dependent Variables, MARC F. BELLEMARE: AGRIC., DEV., & FOOD POL. (June 10,
2013), http://marcfbellemare.com/wordpress/9024 (“[B]ecause no estimator is
perfect, you should you [sic] always estimate all three (LPM, probit, and logit)
and compare their results to make sure nothing is amiss.”). For a discussion of
the tradeoffs among logit, probit, and LPM, see JOSHUA D. ANGRIST & JÖRNSTEFFEN PISCHKE, MOSTLY HARMLESS ECONOMETRICS: AN EMPIRICIST’S
COMPANION (2009). and see also WOOLDRIDGE, supra at 247–50 (explaining
use of LPM for a binary dependent variable, discussing shortcomings, and noting that logit or probit are often used instead).
108. More specifically, measures of statistical significance derive from a
process called hypothesis testing, which determines whether one can confidently reject the “null hypothesis,” or the position that “in the universe, no relationship exists between two variables or no difference exists between two
groups on a particular attribute.” LARRY D. BARNETT, THE PLACE OF LAW: THE
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Table 3: Regression Results
Variable
Non-specialist attorney representation
Specialist attorney representation
White-collar plaintiff occupation
Percent of workers misclassified in occupation
Percent of workers in occupation: women
Percent of workers in occupation: Black or African American
Percent of workers in occupation: Asian
Percent of workers in occupation: Hispanic or Latino
Race discrimination claim in
case
Sex discrimination claim in
case
Other discrimination claim in
case

Coefficient

Standard
Error

95% Confidence
Interval

0.173

0.112

-0.047

0.393

0.362*

0.111

0.144

0.580

0.011

0.146

-0.274

0.297

0.012

0.008

-0.004

0.027

0.029

0.016

-0.002

0.060

-0.048

0.098

-0.240

0.144

-0.020

0.079

-0.175

0.135

0.112

0.065

-0.015

0.239

-0.036

0.116

-0.263

0.192

0.040

0.109

-0.175

0.254

0.184

0.152

-0.114

0.483

ROLE AND LIMITS OF LAW IN SOCIETY 417 (2011). Measures of statistical significance are commonly deployed as a way to deal with the error that is introduced when a random sample is drawn from a larger population and then conclusions from the sample are applied to the whole. Some argue that there is no
need to consider statistical significance when considering data drawn from an
entire population rather than from a sample. See, e.g., id. (contending that
there is no need to compute statistical significance when the data examined
“come from the entire universe of interest”). However, this view is not universal among empiricists, many of whom argue that measures of statistical significance are necessary even when one’s data arguably describes an entire population. This is because even observations from an entire putative “population”
are almost always applied to other, larger, imagined superpopulations, which
include additional, future occurrences that are presently unobserved. See, e.g.,
Andrew Gelman, How Do You Interpret Standard Errors from a Regression Fit
to the Entire Population?, STATISTICAL MODELING, CAUSAL INFERENCE, AND
SOCIAL SCIENCE (Oct. 25, 2011), http://www.andrewgelman.com/2011/10/25/
how-do-you-interpret-standard-errors-from-a-regression-fit-to-the-entire
-population (discussing need to compute some measure of uncertainty because
no putative population is ever truly a population). This Article takes the latter
position: although coders here collected the entire population of Title VII misclassification decisions from 2005 through 2014 available on Westlaw, as explained in Part II.B above, the data set cannot properly be considered a complete population. Thus, the article deploys measures of statistical significance,
using a single asterisk to denote significance at the .05 level. See EPSTEIN &
MARTIN, supra note 107, at 283 (discussing denoting statistical significance at
.05 level); WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 107, at 135–36 (discussing statistical significance and choice of significance levels).
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Variable

Coefficient

Standard
Error

95% Confidence
Interval

Retaliation claim in case

0.027

0.104

-0.177

0.231

-0.276*

0.077

-0.427

-0.125

-0.194

0.209

-0.604

0.217

-0.125

0.192

-0.501

0.251

-0.258*

0.090

-0.434

-0.083

Failure to hire fact pattern in
case
Termination fact pattern in
case
Harassment/discriminatory
conditions claim in case
Reference to written contract
in case
2006

-0.121

0.183

-0.480

0.238

2007

0.337

0.282

-0.215

0.889

2008

0.075

0.327

-0.565

0.715

2009

-0.035

0.209

-0.445

0.375

2010

-0.086

0.194

-0.467

0.295

2011

0.128

0.260

-0.381

0.636

2012

0.116

0.228

-0.332

0.563

2013

0.189

0.292

-0.384

0.761

2014

0.448

0.238

-0.018

0.914

First Circuit

0.682*

0.198

0.294

1.071

Second Circuit

0.359*

0.178

0.010

0.709

Third Circuit

0.281

0.194

-0.100

0.662

Fourth Circuit

0.347*

0.163

0.027

0.667

Sixth Circuit

-0.064

0.091

-0.243

0.115

Seventh Circuit

-0.051

0.085

-0.218

0.116

Eighth Circuit

0.265

0.214

-0.154

0.684

Ninth Circuit

0.103

0.143

-0.177

0.383

Tenth Circuit

0.110

0.195

-0.273

0.493

Eleventh Circuit

0.087

0.154

-0.215

0.389

D.C. Circuit

0.560*

0.269

0.032

1.087

Democrat-appointed judge

-0.159

0.104

-0.362

0.045

2

Notes: N = 154; *p < 0.05; pseudo R = 0.352. Coefficients are reported as
marginal effects at mean values of all variables. For the non-binary variables (attorney representation, circuit, year), the variables in the base category are pro se, the Fifth Circuit, and 2005. All other listed variables are
binary; their opposite value is in the base category.

In interpreting the regression results in Table 3, each
number listed in the “Coefficient” column should be considered
in conjunction with its corresponding value that has been left
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out of the equation, or assigned to the “base category.” For
example, Table 3 tells us the probability of a plaintiff ’s misclassification win when a judge refers to a written contract between the parties (the value included in the regression equation), as compared to cases with no such reference (the value in
the base category). For variables that can take on more than
two values, the value assigned to the base category is noted at
110
the end of Table 3. Table 3 also reports standard errors and
ninety-five percent confidence intervals to give a sense of the
precision of the estimates, or the range of values that the coefficient could take on above and below the figure reported in Ta111
ble 3.
Turning to the results, we can see from Table 3 that five
independent variables were associated at a statistically significant level with a plaintiff ’s misclassification win, as indicated
by the coefficient’s positive sign: specialist attorney representation and decisions made by courts within the First, Second,
Fourth, and D.C. Circuits. More specifically, the probability of a
plaintiff misclassification win increased by 0.362 for plaintiffs
with specialist representation, as compared to pro se plaintiffs.
This 0.362 difference represents a 348% increase over a pro se
112
Notably, the difference in win
plaintiff ’s win probability.
109. As Lee Epstein and her co-authors explain it, in logistic regressions,
“one of the variables is left out of the regression equation, with the result that
the coefficients of the other variables indicate their relation to that one.”
EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 107, at 23.
110. The results for independent variables that are continuous—those that
report the percentage of misclassified workers and demographics of workers in
each occupation—are interpreted differently. For those, the regression equation estimates the impact on the dependent variable from a one unit increase
in the independent variable. The transformation of logistic regression coefficients using marginal effects at means (MEMs) complicates this somewhat.
However, none of the continuous variables produced statistically significant
results in the regression reported in Table 3. See RICHARD WILLIAMS, MARGINAL EFFECTS FOR CONTINUOUS VARIABLES 3, https://www3.nd.edu/
~rwilliam/stats3/Margins02.pdf (last revised Jan. 23, 2016) (“MEMs for continuous variables measure the instantaneous rate of change, which may or
may not be close to the effect on P(Y=1) of a one unit increase in Xk.”).
111. See EPSTEIN & MARTIN, supra note 107, at 238–40 (advocating for reporting not only standard errors but also ninety-five percent confidence intervals).
112. A pro se plaintiff ’s win probability was 0.104; the predicted probability for specialist-represented plaintiffs was 0.466; the 0.362 difference represents a 348 percent increase over the pro se plaintiff ’s misclassification win
probability. See EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 107, at 24 (discussing
calculation of percentage change in outcome probability). Taking account of
the ninety-five percent confidence interval, however, we can see that the coef-
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probabilities between pro se and non-specialist represented
plaintiffs was not significant, meaning that we cannot draw
any conclusions from those results in Table 3. Nevertheless, it
is clear from other research that pro se plaintiffs operate at a
significant disadvantage as compared to represented plaintiffs,
whether due to the underlying lack of merit of their claims or
lack of attorney guidance; this finding aligns with that re113
search.
The other set of variables that were positively correlated
with a plaintiff ’s misclassification win were a district court’s
location in the First, Second, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits. Cases
decided in these circuits fared better than those decided by
courts in the Fifth Circuit, the value in the base category. The
“Circuit” variable was included in the regression to capture potential differences in geography, court makeup, and in the legal
rules that courts employ in misclassification cases. Here, an
explanatory note is in order.
Though the coders originally recorded whether each district court used the common law or hybrid test for employee
status, this “test” variable was not used in the regression reported in Table 3. This is because in fourteen cases, courts used
no test at all, and conclusorily declared the plaintiff an independent contractor on the basis of the pleadings, the existence
114
of a written contract, or a plaintiff admission. When the “test”
variable is included in the regression, it creates problems, as
the fourteen no-test values perfectly predict plaintiff misclassification losses. When the no-test values are dropped, the choice
between the common law and hybrid tests turns out to have no
statistically significant effect on the misclassification outcome—possibly lending support to the Restatement’s position
115
that the two tests are functionally equivalent in practice.

ficient could be as low as 0.144 and as high as 0.580, meaning that the misclassification win probability for specialist-represented plaintiffs could actually increase (as compared to pro se plaintiffs) by between 138 and 558 percent.
113. See Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 188–89 (finding that pro se plaintiffs in their sample were “almost three times more likely to have their cases
dismissed, [we]re less likely to gain early settlement, and [we]re twice as likely to lose on summary judgment. . . . The powerful effect of legal representation might be explained as a selection effect. That is, obtaining legal representation reveals an otherwise unmeasured variable of quality of case”).
114. In the remaining 140 cases, seventy-one percent of courts used the
common law test and twenty-nine percent used the hybrid test.
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 1.01 cmt. d–e (AM. LAW INST.,
Proposed Final Draft 2014).
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Moreover, a court’s use of no test at all was highly correlated
with a plaintiff ’s pro se status and with the misclassification
decision’s reference to a written contract, variables that themselves produced significant results. For these reasons, the “test”
116
variable was dropped from the regression.
Moreover, among the courts that did use a test, their choice
of the common law or hybrid test was highly correlated with
the circuit in which they were located. As Table 4 shows, all
misclassification decisions issued by district courts in the Fifth
Circuit, for example, that used a test used the hybrid test. This
is in contrast with the Second Circuit, in which courts used the
common law test in all nineteen decisions.
Table 4: District Courts’ Employee Status Test Usage by
Circuit

First Circuit

Common
Law Test
9

Hybrid
Test
0

0

Second Circuit

19

0

0

Third Circuit

13

0

1

Fourth Circuit

13

2

3

Circuit

No Test

Fifth Circuit

0

12

1

Sixth Circuit

8

1

1

Seventh Circuit

6

5

1

Eighth Circuit

8

4

1

Ninth Circuit

13

3

3

Tenth Circuit

4

2

1

Eleventh Circuit

3

10

1

D.C. Circuit

3

2

1

Total

99

41

14

Note: N=154

Because the hybrid test is generally seen as more plaintifffriendly than the common law test, one would expect decisions
from common law-heavy circuits to favor plaintiffs less fre117
quently. This is not the case in the regression results shown
116. See KENNEDY, supra note 63, at 197 (discussing dropping highly correlated, or collinear, variables).
117. See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 7, at 114 (advocating for the economic realities test over the common law test: “A liberal definition of employee status is
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in Table 3: in the common law-heavy First, Second, and Fourth
Circuits, as well as the mixed D.C. Circuit, variables produced
better plaintiff win probabilities than in the Fifth. This could
be read as further confirmation of the Restatement’s position
that the common law and hybrid tests actually converge in re118
ality, seen in combination with the lack of statistical significance of the “test” variable on its own. However, the circuit differences observed here are likely also the result of a
combination of unobserved factors, including perhaps the varying political ideologies and compositions of the panels that is119
sue precedential misclassification decisions.
Finally, two variables were negatively associated with
plaintiff misclassification wins at a statistically significant level: the presence of a failure to hire fact pattern in the underlying Title VII case and the reference to a written contract between the parties in the misclassification decision. The
probability of a misclassification win for those plaintiffs alleging a discriminatory failure to hire decreased by 0.276 as compared to those plaintiffs who made no such allegation, a drop of
ninety percent. For those cases in which the decision referred to
a written contract, the predicted probability of a misclassification win decreased by 0.258, or a seventy percent drop as com120
pared with those decisions in which no reference appeared.

critical to that goal, as part of an interlocking structure that guarantees the
broadest possible access to protection against employment discrimination. The
economic realities test ensures that goal by focusing on the employer’s ability
to erect arbitrary, unnecessary barriers to employment opportunities based on
race, sex, religion or national origin. This broad test is essential to guaranteeing that the policies and goals of Title VII will be achieved”).
118. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 1.01 cmt. d–e.
119. See generally EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 107 (discussing
influences on circuit judges’ decision-making). There is also the question of
whether and how well district courts, whose decisions are studied here, actually follow circuit court guidance in deciding which legal test to employ.
120. Taking account of the ninety-five percent confidence intervals for both
the failure to hire and written contract variables, we can see that the coefficient for failure to hire could range from -0.427 to -0.125 and the coefficient for
the written contract variable could range from -0.434 to -0.083. This means
that the misclassification win probability for plaintiffs with failure to hire
claims could actually decrease by between 139 and 41 percent, and the win
probability could decrease with the presence of a written contract reference by
between 118 and 22 percent.
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IV. DISCUSSION
This Part returns to the three theories summarized above
to contextualize the regression results and make some normative critiques about courts’ processing of misclassification challenges. First, with regard to legal formalism, as the previous
Part explained, a court’s choice of the common law or hybrid
test did not produce a statistically significant change in a plaintiff ’s probability of winning a misclassification challenge. Nor
did the variable that captured the relative misclassification
risk in a plaintiff ’s occupation—a rough merits proxy—have a
statistically significant impact on a plaintiff ’s win probability.
It may be tempting to interpret these non-results as a refutation of legal formalism and confirmation of critical realism,
i.e., the position that legal rules do not matter as much as other
121
factors in influencing the outcome of legal disputes. However,
regression coefficients that are not statistically significant cannot be read as such: they merely fail to prove or disprove a relationship (or lack thereof) between the independent and de122
pendent variables. Alternatively, these results could be seen
as confirmation of the Restatement’s position that the two ostensibly separate legal tests are not actually all that differ123
ent. In this view, the lack of a result with respect to the “test”
variable does not mean that courts are disregarding the law,
but rather that the law they are applying cannot be meaningfully divided into “common law” and “hybrid” approaches. The
non-result may therefore be an artifact of the lack of distinction
between the two values that the “test” variable can take on.
In fact, some of the other regression results suggest that
the law may matter in ways that are consistent with legal formalism. The fact that plaintiffs who were represented by specialist attorneys are so much more likely to succeed in their
misclassification challenges than pro se plaintiffs may suggest
that attorneys can gauge the strength of a claim against some
legal standard, and that courts do, in fact, employ that same
124
legal standard in deciding wins and losses.
121. See supra Parts III.B.1, III.B.3.
122. See WOOLDRIDGE, supra note 107, at 135–37 (explaining interpretation of regression non-results).
123. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 1.01 cmt. d–e.
124. See Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 178 (“The formal legal model would
assume that the behavior of lawyers in accepting, defending, and settling cases will reflect their knowledge of the law and their prediction of how a judge or
jury would decide a case.”).
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The lower probability of a misclassification win for plaintiffs with hiring discrimination claims may also support a legal
125
formalist view. As a general matter, hiring discrimination
claims tend to be particularly hard for plaintiffs to win. This is
because plaintiffs who are in the position of a rejected applicant
may lack evidence about why they were rejected (other than
their own suspicions of discrimination) and must wait until discovery to amass the statistics or other proof supporting their
126
claim. Judges may therefore be consciously or unconsciously
targeting discriminatory hiring claims for dismissal on the misclassification question, to avoid having to engage with those
127
cases’ messy fact patterns later in litigation. The formal proof
requirements that doom the underlying Title VII hiring claim
may thus be casting a shadow earlier in the case to doom a
plaintiff ’s misclassification challenge as well.
A less tangential connection between the presence of a
failure to hire claim in a lawsuit and a misclassification loss
might stem from the nature of the allegations and proof that a
worker must present in order to win the misclassification claim
itself. Both versions of the employee status test require courts
to consider a variety of fact-specific criteria in distinguishing
between employees and independent contractors, including, inter alia, the worker’s schedule and method of payment and the
128
putative employer’s record keeping and level of control. When
a worker has never been hired, he or she has no facts from
which to draw to make a showing on these factors. Thus, the
worker is in the position of arguing about what his or her hypothetical work relationship would have looked like had he or she
been hired. This would seem to be an exceedingly difficult task,
making hiring discrimination cases particularly hard to win on
129
the misclassification question. Consistent with a legal formal125. See supra Part III.B.1.
126. See Jessica Fink, Unintended Consequences: How Antidiscrimination
Litigation Increases Group Bias in Employer-Defendants, 38 N.M. L. REV. 333,
346 (2008) (“[I]t always has been harder for an individual to ‘prove’ that he or
she was wrongfully passed over for a position than that he or she was wrongfully fired.”).
127. See id.
128. See Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751–52
(1989) (describing factors considered in the common law test); Oestman v.
Nat’l Farmers Union Ins., 958 F.2d 303, 305 (10th Cir. 1992) (describing factors considered in the hybrid common law-economic realities test).
129. Non-traditional employment relationships present additional conceptual difficulties in drawing “hiring” and “firing” lines. For example, imagine a
worker who is labeled an independent contractor and engaged for a particular
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ist view, the proof requirements of the law, and the plaintiff ’s
inability to meet them, would seem to explain the plaintiff ’s
130
loss. Thus, buried within the regression results are some legal formalist hints that the law does matter to judges’ misclassification decisions, though the common law-hybrid distinction
131
seems to matter less than some commentators would believe.
Second, contractual formalist theories find support in the
regression result regarding judges’ references to written contracts: in cases with such a reference, a plaintiff ’s misclassification win probability was seventy percent lower than in cases
132
with no such reference. These cases, which represented just
over one-third of the data set, were of two types: those in which
courts cited the presence of a contract in conclusorily declaring
the plaintiff an independent contractor, and those in which
courts cited a contract but also engaged in a multifactor analysis, ultimately ruling against the plaintiff. In an example of the
latter, a Northern District of Indiana court stated the following:
The best evidence of Jones’ independent contractor status is contained
within the plain language of the Agreement itself. Jones is identified
as, and signed the Agreement as, an independent contractor. The
term “independent contractor” is used on numerous occasions
throughout the [two]-page document. By signing the Agreement Jones
acknowledged its contents and cannot now be heard to claim she
133
thought she was an employee of AWS.

Though the court went on to consider a variety of facts about
134
the parties’ underlying work relationship, the outcome of the
plaintiff ’s misclassification challenge was likely predetermined
by the court’s characterization of the parties’ written contract
as the “best evidence of [the plaintiff ’s] independent contractor
135
status.”
job. The job ends, and she is not engaged again when another job becomes
available. Is this a termination or a failure to hire?
130. See Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 178 (“The outcome of a case should
be determined by how well a plaintiff meets the formal requirements for making and proving a claim of discrimination.”).
131. See, e.g., Dowd, supra note 7, at 114 (advocating for the ostensibly
broader economic realities test over the common law test to achieve Title VII’s
broad remedial purpose).
132. See supra Part III.B.2.
133. Jones v. A.W. Holdings, LLC, No. 109cv284 WCL, 2011 WL 488634, at
*13–14 (N.D. Ind. Feb. 7, 2011); see also cases cited supra note 100.
134. Jones, 2011 WL 488634, at *13–19.
135. Id. at *13 (considering economic realities factors). Of course, a correlation between plaintiff misclassification losses and the presence of a written
contract does not necessarily mean that the contract caused the loss. Work relationships in which a written contract was present might also feature more
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As Julia Tomassetti has observed, courts that engage in
this sort of reasoning, in which the existence of a written contract serves a sort of talismanic purpose, are “construct[ing] the
written work contract as an institutional marker of nonemployment, and . . . this construction is often a misleading use
136
of contractual formalism.” Indeed, the misclassification analysis requires courts to set aside the labels that the parties assign to their working relationship and instead to consider the
137
facts of the relationship as it actually operated. Courts that
fail to engage with this sort of analysis are employing what
Barton Beebe has labeled in a different context “a ‘fast and frugal’ heuristic[] to short-circuit the multifactor analysis” re138
quired by either the common law or hybrid approach.
The upshot of courts’ reliance on written contracts is that
they functionally cede the power to define the parties’ relationship to the parties themselves. This is troubling on a practical
level because of the possibility of sham contracts that are not
bilateral at all; workers may sign them not because they intend
to create an independent contractor relationship, but because
139
they fear losing their job if they refuse. Such a sham contract
indicia of independence on the part of the worker. However, in cases like
Jones, causation appears more likely, as the court expressly characterized the
contract as the “best evidence” of the worker’s status.
136. Tomassetti, supra note 6, at 1114; see also Wood v. Lucy, Lady DuffGordon, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (N.Y. 1917) (criticizing contractual formalism for
viewing “the precise word was the sovereign talisman”).
137. See supra Part III.B.2.
138. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581, 1581 (2006) (discussing judges’
shortcuts in the context of multifactor trademark infringement analyses).
Thanks to Robert Bird for this insight.
139. See Russell v. BSN Med., Inc., 721 F. Supp. 2d 465, 474 (W.D.N.C.
2010) (describing a worker who was pressured to sign a contract labeling her
an independent contractor and “was told multiple times she would be fired if
she did not sign the Agreement by a specific date”; noting the employer’s “obvious incentive from a legal liability standpoint to memorialize in writing that
Russell was an independent contractor rather than an employee”); Peeples v.
Prestige Delivery Sys., Inc., Civil Action No. 11-2373, 2011 WL 6303246, at *3
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 16, 2011) (dismissing the plaintiff ’s Title VII claims on the
ground that he had signed an “Independent Contractor Operating Agreement,”
despite evidence that “Plaintiff [had been] compelled to sign the 2006 agreement without the opportunity to negotiate its terms and without the benefit of
legal counsel”); Payroll Fraud Hearing, supra note 29, at 4 (statement of
Catherine K. Ruckelshaus, National Employment Law Project) (“When job opportunities are scarce, workers face increased pressure to acquiesce to independent contractor arrangements. An Ohio worker who agreed in 2010 to be
labeled an independent contractor as a condition of getting a job building
housing for the homeless under a federal grant explained, ‘I went along with it
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then becomes indistinguishable from the employer-imposed
unilateral “independent contractor” label that courts are so
140
quick to reject.
On a more theoretical level, courts’ reliance on the existence of a written contract between the parties to short-circuit
the misclassification inquiry threatens to undermine the non141
waiver principle that is the bedrock of employment law. As
Cynthia Estlund explains, “[M]ost employee rights—such as
the right to be paid a minimum wage or to be free from discrim142
ination—cannot be waived ex ante.” Estlund comments that,
due to the variety of mandates and prohibitions imposed by
employment and labor statutes, “[t]he vast and varied domain
of employee rights has made the employment relationship as
143
much a creature of public law as of private law.” Public law
statutes like Title VII therefore create a set of inalienable employment rights, which workers cannot waive and employers
144
cannot contract around, even with a willing partner. Courts
because I felt my back was up against the wall. I have a family. My fiance [sic]
was in school. I’m the only bread winner.’”).
140. See supra Part III.B.2.
141. Thanks to comments by Noah Zatz for prompting this thought.
142. Cynthia L. Estlund, Between Rights and Contract: Arbitration Agreements and Non-Compete Covenants as a Hybrid Form of Employment Law,
155 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 388 n.19 (2006) (citing Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 739–40 (1981)) recognizing that the Fair Labor Standards Act’s protections against substandard wages and oppressive
conditions “cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived”); Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974) (“[T]here can be no prospective
waiver of an employee’s rights under Title VII.”).
143. Estlund, supra note 142, at 387.
144. See Eisenberg v. Advance Relocation & Storage, Inc., 237 F.3d 111,
116 (2d Cir. 2000) (“While the rights to intellectual property can depend on
contractual terms, the right to be treated in a non-discriminatory manner does
not depend on the terms of any particular contract. Rather, these ‘public law’
rights were vested in workers as a class by Congress, and they are not subject
to waiver or sale by individuals.” (citation omitted)); Yu v. N.Y.C. Hous. Dev.
Corp. (HDC), No. 07 Civ. 5541(GBD)(MHD), 2011 WL 2326892, at *28
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16, 2011) (“[D]efendants’ argument that plaintiff ’s employment
status was agreed upon in the Consulting Agreement is without merit. . . .
Employers cannot simply contract their way around the antidiscrimination
laws, since these laws create rights that ‘are not subject to waiver or sale.’
Thus, ‘employment contracts, no matter what the circumstances that justify
their execution or what the terms, may not be used to waive protections granted to an individual under [Title VII] or any other [A]ct of Congress.’” (quoting
Eisenberg, 237 F.3d at 116–17)); cf. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral,
85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092–93 (1972) (discussing inalienability in property
rights); Michael C. Harper, Union Waiver of Employee Rights Under the
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in misclassification cases whose decisions are predetermined by
the existence of a written contract make inroads on inalienability, allowing the parties to enact a prospective super-waiver not
only of their Title VII rights, but also of the great majority of all
other federal labor and employment rights whose coverage
145
turns on employee status.
Third, the regression results neither fully corroborate nor
contradict the critical realist position that the parties’ social
status is an important predictor of success in litigation. The regression yielded no statistically significant results for the
white-collar plaintiff occupation variable, for instance, one that
might predict plaintiff success in a critical realist world. Nor
were plaintiffs who brought disfavored race and national origin
discrimination claims less successful on the misclassification
question, at a statistically significant level, than those who
made other types of discrimination allegation. Nor did plaintiffs
who held jobs associated heavily with women or people of color
146
fare worse than other workers.
However, the striking success of specialist-represented
plaintiffs, interpreted above as possible support for the legal
formalist position that high-merit cases win more often, could
also be interpreted as support for the critical realist position
that more socially powerful plaintiffs win more often. As Nielsen et al. put it, the assumption is that more socially powerful
and wealthier plaintiffs “will convert these social resources into
147
legal resources” such as specialist attorneys.
Yet the real confirmation for the critical realist position
might not be found by examining the results of cases that are
actually filed in court. As Part II.C above explored in its discussion of selection effects, critical realism could be deployed to
explain the slippage between the categories of misclassified
workers who are most likely to experience discrimination and
those plaintiffs who actually file Title VII cases and challenge
their independent contractor status. That the workers in the
NLRA: Part I, 4 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 335 (1981) (discussing inalienable rights in labor law); Michael L. Wachter, The Law and Economics of Collective Bargaining: An Introduction and Application to the Problems of Subcontracting, Partial Closure, and Relocation, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1368
(1988) (same).
145. See Eisenberg, 237 F.3d at 116–17; Yu, 2011 WL 2326892, at *28.
146. The fact that there were no statistically significant results with respect to these variables does not mean that no relationship exists as a matter
of fact, just that none can be discerned from these data.
147. Nielsen et al., supra note 8, at 180.
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former category tend to hold lower wage, bluer-collar jobs than
the plaintiffs in the latter would be no surprise to the critical
realist.
CONCLUSION
This Article has asked two questions. First, to what extent
is misclassification removing Title VII coverage from workers
who are otherwise likely to become antidiscrimination plaintiffs? Second, how are courts resolving Title VII misclassification disputes, acting to bring workers back into the statute’s
ambit?
From the foregoing analyses, we can suggest some tentative answers. First, misclassification appears to be both gendered and raced, pulling disproportionate numbers of women
and workers of color out of Title VII’s coverage. Of the eight occupations that are most at risk for misclassification and contribute the most misclassified workers to the economy, women
and/or people of color are overrepresented in seven. And women
of color are overrepresented in four: hairdressers, maids and
housekeepers, teacher assistants, and door-to-door sales workers and street vendors. This suggests that misclassification
may be undermining the protections offered by Title VII by removing workers from the statute’s reach. Second, the workers
who turn to the courts to challenge their improper classification
and gain access to Title VII are a different group from those
just described. Consistent with previous research and with the
critical realist perspective, the workers who use the courts are
generally better paid and thus more socially privileged than the
larger population of potential Title VII plaintiffs who are misclassified. These results raise serious, though far from novel,
questions about access to justice.
Third, even those workers who use the courts do not fare
very well, as two-thirds lose their misclassification challenges.
And fourth, misclassification losses are unevenly distributed,
as specialist attorney representation and circuit location predict greater plaintiff misclassification win probabilities; underlying hiring discrimination allegations and judges’ references to
written contracts predict lower win probabilities. This final
finding is particularly interesting, and troubling, given its implications for the inalienability of employment rights.
These conclusions highlight multiple areas in which further study is needed. Specifically, this Article has set aside the
two central questions of why misclassification occurs in the oc-
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cupations identified in the Roemer research, and why gender
and race distributions occur as they do among those high misclassification occupations. Solving those riddles would help in
constructing solutions to the misclassification problems identified here.
APPENDIX
Table 5: Occupations Most at Risk for Misclassification,
as Measured by CPS-DER Mismatch Rate (Numbers in
Thousands)148
Occupation
Real estate brokers and sales
agents
Barbers
Fishers and related fishing
workers
Miscellaneous social scientists and related workers
Clergy
Dentists
Maids and housekeeping
cleaners
Childcare workers
Carpet, floor, and tile installers and finishers
Hairdressers, hairstylists,
and cosmetologists
Lawyers
Judges, magistrates, and
other judicial workers
Door-to-door sales workers,
news and street vendors, and
related workers
Teacher assistants
Farmers, ranchers, and other
agricultural managers
Management analysts
Musicians, singers, and related workers
Insurance sales agents

148. ROEMER, supra note 26.

Total
Workers in
Occupation

Misclassified
Workers in
Occupation

Percent of
Workers
Misclassified

1,027

450

43.8

79

26

32.9

78

22

28.2

37

9

24.3

953
163

217
37

22.8
22.7

919

160

17.4

482

76

15.8

312

43

13.8

1,287

175

13.6

1,488

185

12.4

1,488

185

12.4

782

82

10.5

1,176

115

9.8

444

43

9.7

480

45

9.4

259

24

9.3

1,345

115

8.6
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Occupation
Securities, commodities, and
financial services sales
agents
Taxi drivers and chauffeurs
Court, municipal, and license
clerks
Artists and related workers
Carpenters
Psychologists
Physicians and surgeons
Photographers
Construction laborers
Advertising sales agents
Designers
Roofers
Property, real estate, and
community association managers
First-line supervisors of construction trades and extraction workers
Painters, construction and
maintenance
Grounds maintenance workers
Driver/sales workers and
truck drivers
Sales representatives,
wholesale and manufacturing
Sales representatives, services, all other
Miscellaneous agricultural
workers
Automotive service technicians and mechanics
Marketing and sales managers

959

Total
Workers in
Occupation

Misclassified
Workers in
Occupation

Percent of
Workers
Misclassified

874

74

8.5

422

35

8.3

194

15

7.7

234
2,801
553
1,444
276
2,361
359
1,305
481

15
164
31
79
15
128
18
59
20

6.4
5.9
5.6
5.5
5.4
5.4
5.0
4.5
4.2

764

30

3.9

1,412

55

3.9

1,101

42

3.8

2,290

78

3.4

7,636

241

3.2

4,084

121

3.0

1,614

47

2.9

2,522

69

2.7

2,134

55

2.6

10,750

226

2.1

Notes: All occupations listed had CPS-DER mismatch likelihood ratios of
at least one percent, per Roemer. Mismatch percentages, rather than likelihood ratios, are reported here, due to the difficulty of reverseengineering Roemer’s table without access to the underlying data. Occupation names listed here have been converted to their closest equivalent
among the standardized occupations used in Bureau of Labor Statistics
data.
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Table 6.1: Descriptive Statistics: Categorical Variables
Variable

Frequency

Percent

Misclassification win for plaintiff
Misclassification loss for plaintiff
Misclassification win cases only:
Title VII win for plaintiff
Title VII settlement
Title VII loss for plaintiff
Case still open
All cases:
Title VII win for plaintiff
Title VII settlement
Title VII loss for plaintiff
Case still open
Pro se plaintiff
Non-specialist attorney representation
Specialist attorney representation
Blue-collar plaintiff occupation
White-collar plaintiff occupation
Overlap occupations:
Judges, magistrates, and other judicial workers
Clergy
Real estate brokers and sales agents
Hairdressers, hairstylists, and cosmetologists
Teacher assistants
Door-to-door sales workers, news and street
vendors, and related workers
Maids and housekeeping cleaners
Defendant industry:
Trucking, construction, maintenance
Retail
Manufacturing, agriculture
Package delivery
School, university
Medical, health, social services
Media, entertainment
Government
Financial services, insurance, other professional services
Race discrimination claim in case
No race discrimination claim in case
Sex discrimination claim in case

53
101

34.42
65.58

3
34
12
4

5.66
64.15
22.64
7.55

3
34
113
4
53
45
56
50
104

1.95
22.08
73.38
2.60
34.42
29.22
36.36
32.47
67.53

1

0.65

1
3
0
0

0.65
1.95
0.00
0.00

3

1.95

0

0.00

24
7
8
7
10
28
11
26

15.58
4.55
5.19
4.55
6.49
18.18
7.14
16.88

33

21.43

68
86
82

44.16
55.84
53.25
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Variable

Frequency

Percent

No sex discrimination claim in case
Any other discrimination claim in case:
Religious discrimination claim in case
No religious discrimination claim in case
National origin discrimination claim in case
No national origin discrimination claim in
case
Color discrimination claim in case
No color discrimination claim in case
No other discrimination claim in case
Retaliation claim in case
No retaliation claim in case
Failure to hire fact pattern in case
No failure to hire fact pattern in case
Termination fact pattern in case
No termination fact pattern in case
Harassment/discriminatory conditions claim in case
No harassment/discriminatory conditions claim in case
Democrat-appointed judge
Republican-appointed judge
Common law agency test
Hybrid test
No test
Reference to written contract in case
No reference to written contract in case
First Circuit
Second Circuit
Third Circuit
Fourth Circuit
Fifth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Eighth Circuit
Ninth Circuit
Tenth Circuit
Eleventh Circuit
D.C. Circuit
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010

72
35
15
139
23

46.75
77.27
9.74
90.26
14.94

131

85.06

7
147
119
75
79
15
139
83
71
74
80
60
94
99
41
14
52
102
9
19
14
18
13
10
12
13
19
7
14
6
9
12
10
9
18
25

4.55
95.45
77.27
48.70
51.30
9.74
90.26
53.90
46.10
48.05
51.95
38.96
61.04
64.29
26.62
9.09
33.77
66.23
5.84
12.34
9.09
11.69
8.44
6.49
7.79
8.44
12.34
4.55
9.09
3.90
5.84
7.79
6.49
5.84
11.69
16.23
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Variable

Frequency

Percent

2011
2012
2013
2014

18
22
14
17

11.69
14.29
9.09
11.04

Table 6.2: Descriptive Statistics: Continuous Variables
Variable

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Median

Standard
Deviation

Percent of workers
misclassified in
occupation

0.0

43.8

3.9

0.0

7.01

Number of workers
misclassified in
occupation
(in thousands)

0.0

450.0

59.3

0.0

99.9

Percent of workers
in occupation:
women

0.0

22.0

3.7

4.0

3.46

Percent of workers
in occupation: Black
or African American

0.0

3.0

0.4

0.0

0.57

Percent of workers
in occupation: Asian

0.0

2.0

0.4

0.0

0.74

Percent of workers
in occupation:
Hispanic or Latino

0.0

5.0

0.9

1.0

0.93

